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Abstract
Currently, the operational Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) do not
offer message, nor signal Authentication and Integrity Protection toward the Open
Service (OS) users. But a well-motivated attacker equipped with a single antenna
can successively perform several attacks, e.g. Jamming, and Signal-Synthesis attack
to affect the position solution, or even a Replay attack which modify the timing
awareness. Because of this threats, robust defending techniques are needed. The
nascent European navigation system - Galileo, aspires to offer an E1 OS signal
authentication and integrity protection mechanism integrated from the outset. Ac-
tually, a wide State-Of-Art about defende techniques already exists. But these all
have a common vulnerability: they are based on computationally secure algorithms
(e.g. Digital Signal Algorithm), or are designed only against a specific attack.
This thesis work, inserted into a collaborative project with the European Space
Agency (ESA), aims at contributing to the issue by adopting a different approach.
Namely, we deal the problem from the Physical Layer point of view, and with-
out limiting the attacker capabilities and advantages. Furthermore, no specific
authentication scheme is chosen or designed, but only generic channel models
are considered. In this manner, a theoretic key entropy lower bound is defined
for both Data and Signal level. Their performance is then presented considering
some simplified channel and signal setting, but against a well-equipped attacker.
In addition, the Data-layer bound is compared with the actual most promising
protocol - TESLA. Therefore, the work provides a reference bound to guarantee
unconditionally secure Authentication and Integrity Protection. Finally, the DLR
channel model is exploited in order to extract some useful features (e.g. coherence
time) within a more realistic scenery.
iii
iv ABSTRACT
Acknowledgements
Concluding these five years of study, I would give my acknowledgements to some
people who have been essential. I will start from Professor Nicola Laurenti, my
thesis supervisor, he has passionately introduced me to the world of Information
Secrecy and Security, and then he has given me the possibility of applying it to
another interesting topic: the satellite navigation systems. I am very grateful for
his helpfulness, kindness and extraordinary competence that he has always shown
during the difficulties of the work. Next, I thank as well Gianluca Caparra, whose
advices and experience have enormously helped me in speeding up the outcomes
achievement. I wish say a big thank to both since I have felt part of a nice group,
where one can find professionalism and pleasantness too. Further, I am completely
satisfied about the chosen thesis argument, since it is extremely actual and useful;
and it has enriched even more my knowledges.
Another important acknowledgement goes to my parents, Raffaele and Francesca.
It is thank to them if today I have reached this beautiful goal. They have always
supported me materially and morally, believing in my abilities even when I have
doubted of myself. And if today I am happy about me, it is due to them. Thanks
also to my sister Chiara, who in these years has had to bear my little free time,
and nervous moments.
Then there is my greatest supporter, my fiancé Loris, who from the beginning
has always been close to me with affection, sympathy and good tips. I thank him
immensely for the confidence and patience shown me. And to him, who perfectly
knows the telecommunications world, I dedicate this thesis.
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Furthermore, I have had the pleasure to meet special and very brilliant people.
Some of them have not been only fellow students, but have become great friends, I
thank Marco, Mattia, Giulia, Maria, Chiara, Trinh and Thomas. They all know
what means studying and working hard, together we have lived several worries and
stressful moments. But we also have passed incredible memories, as the funny lunch
times all together, or the beautiful adventures around Spain during the Erasmus
semester.
Last but not least, I thank Ilaria and Valentina, that since the highschool have
always been close to me. The endless chats with them, are always indispensable
and pleasant.
A big thank to all of you, and everyone who in these years has crossed my way!
Silvia
Contents
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements v
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Thesis objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Thesis structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Navigation and interfering signals 5
2.1 Basics of GNSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1 Position and Timing determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Satellite signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 GNSS impairments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 Attacks on GNSS signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 A review of possible defenses in GNSS 19
3.1 Non-Cryptographic Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.1 PNT solution layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.2 Data layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.3 Signal processing layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.4 Cooperative Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Cryptographic Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.1 Asymmetric-key defenses at data-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.2 Signal-layer defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
vii
viii CONTENTS
3.2.3 Cooperative methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 An introduction to Galileo System 39
4.0.1 Signal Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.0.2 Message structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5 Derivation of bounds on the key size 47
5.1 Navigation data authentication at the physical-layer . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1.1 The noiseless channel model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.1.2 The noisy wiretap channel model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Signal authentication at the physical-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.2.1 The channel authentication scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.2.2 The single-tap impulse response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6 Implementations and results 63
6.1 Navigation data authentication and integrity protection . . . . . . . 63
6.1.1 A discrete time memoryless AWGN wiretap channel . . . . . 63
6.1.2 Binary input and AWGN wiretap channel . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.2 Signal authentication and integrity protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.2.1 The single-tap AWGN channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.2.2 The DLR channel model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7 Conclusions 81
Acronyms
BOC Binary Offset Carrier
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
CS Commercial Service
DOS Denial-Of-Service
DS Digital Signature
DSSS direct sequence spread spectrum
EC Elliptic Curve
ECI Earth Centered Inertial
ECEF Earth Centered Earth Fixed
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
FEC Forward Error Correction
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite Systems
GPS Global Positioning System
GPST GPS Time
GST Galileo System Time
MAC Message Authentication Code
ix
x CONTENTS
MEO Medium Earth Orbit
NMA Navigation Message Authentication
OS Open Service
PNT Position-Navigation-Timing
PRN Pseudo Random Noise
PRS Public Regulated Service
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
SAR Search and Rescue Service
SCE Spreading Code Encryption
SCER Secure Code Estimation and Replay
SOL Safety Of Life
SV Space Vehicle
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
TOA Time-Of-Arrival
UTC Universal Time Coordinates
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
The science that deals with driving crafts, vehicles or people from one place to
another is known as navigation. This is a daily-life skill that since ancient times
man has developed, firstly using the senses, and then by identifying landmarks
around him. With the terrestrial radio signals introduction the navigation accuracy
has seen a first change, but the real revolution was led by the Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSS). This kind of systems provide us Position-Navigation-
Timing (PNT) means satellite signals Time-Of-Arrival (TOA) [2].
The United States Global Positioning System (GPS) has been the first: it is
operational since 1978 in military domain, and since 1994 has become globally avail-
able [2]. In 2000 the Selective Availability (i.e. an intentional signal degradation)
was abolished, thus it has started to provide the civilian users with a relatively
high precision service, and made GPS the world’s most utilized satellite navigation
system.
In addition, over the past two decades, the ever decreasing price of receiver devices
has led to a significant integration of GNSS in people every-day life, becoming
an important component in the information world, fully integrated with Internet
and many other technologies [22]. Indeed a large number of applications make
use of te GNSSs signal. It was initially employed in car and vehicles navigation,
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but nowadays there are also real-time traffic control, valuable goods traceability,
safety during flight and landing operations, dangerous situations and emergencies
assistance, and agriculture optimization; it is also used to assist the electricity
distribution network, and finally ensure very accurate timestamps in financial
trades. Furthermore, given the recent success of smartphones, apps and social
networks, GNSS can be used also for trivial needs as the nearby services search, or
to locate the places where we took our pictures [3].
However, the increasing use of GNSS, and the growing dependence on it have
a drawback: it can stimulate an hacker to attempt illegitimate attacks, either in
order to take advantage over someone/something (e.g. because of prospect for
financial gain), or with terrorist purpose [22], [13]. As a matter of fact the existing
GNSSs, such as GPS or the Russian GLONASS, offer no authentication of their
signal towards their civilian users, so several types of attack against GNSS may
be performed without being detected, as we will see in Chapter 2. Thus, in recent
years awareness has risen that, given the amount of civilian positioning application
requiring safety and security, also the GNSS Open Service (OS) need message
authentication and integrity protection urgently.
Briefly, message authentication ensures that the message has been sent by
the legitimate transmitter and not been forged by a false entity, while integrity
protection guarantees that during the transmission no changes have been made to
the message. So far, several techniques have been proposed, but the problem is
particularly complex and requires different skills. For instance, in GNSS the un-
modified data content does not guarantee signal integrity as well, because the signal
can be artificially delayed by an attacker, to alter the ranging information. Thus,
as we will see, it is necessary to work on two levels, namely Data and Physical layers.
Galileo is the new European GNSS that approaches even more the stage of
opening. This latter has in charge several improvements over GPS, but the signal
authentication holds a primary attention. Therefore, given the serious consequences
that a lack of authentication mechanism can lead to, several resources are being
invested in the Galileo E1 OS signal authentication and integrity protection design.
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1.2 Thesis objective
The current thesis work is inserted into a partnership between the Department
of Information Engineering from the University of Padua, and the European Space
Agency (ESA). It is focused on the Galileo signal Authentication and Integrity
protection. It takes especially into account the E1 band Galileo Open Service (OS)
signal; thus herein we will refer to the corresponding technical features chosen by
ESA for it [1].
Given the already proposed defense techniques state-of-art vulnerabilities, this
thesis aims at treating the problem with a more robust approach, being as general
as possible. Namely, via Information Theory tools we are going to identify two
key bounds valid whatever the encoding/authentication scheme adopted, and the
attacker skills. This latter aspect is even more important, that is, the current work
aims at the Unconditional authentication and integrity protection.
1.3 Thesis structure
In Chapter 2 the reader is introduced to the fundamentals of the modern
satellite navigation systems, such as to its architecture, functioning and signals.
In addition, a mathematical explanation of the position computation, and the
techniques to deal with hardware imperfections will be given. Finally, all the
possible signal impairments, and intentional attacks will be listed.
Chapter 3 is devoted to analyse the actual mechanisms for detecting and mitigating
attacks. The first part of the chapter treats a series of checks at different layers (e.g.
Position, Signal and Data) that one can perform to discover any signal inconsistency.
While in the second part, we first give an introduction to useful cryptographic
primitives, and then describe several cryptographic defense techniques - at Data
and Signal levels - proposed in the literature against the attacks introduced in
Chapter 2.
The Galileo OS specifications and its peculiarities with respect to GPS, useful
to the thesis work are highlighted within Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the
different approach of this thesis with respect to methods in Chapter 3. The notions
of Unconditional Authentication and Integrity Protection will be given, and an
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Information Theory analysis will return the corresponding lower bound on the
required key entropy ( i.e. length) at both Data and Signal layers. Everything, will
be matched to a suitable channel and signal setting. In Chapter 6 the specifics
adopted to simulate via MATLAB the achievements of Chapter 5 will be declared.
Furthermore, our proposals outcomes, respectively at Data and Signal layer, will
be discussed and, when it is possible, compared with other existing options. Our
idea will also be tested in a more realistic scenery, that is the DLR channel model.
Finally, Chapter 7 will provide a summary of the thesis important achievements,
and outlines which is going to be the future work.
Chapter 2
Navigation and interfering signals
2.1 Basics of GNSS
In this section some GNSS basic concepts are outlined, that are needed to
understand a possible system vulnerability, and how an attacker action can take
place. In the following, notions will be given regardless of the specific system, but
we will refer to GPS, and Galileo in particular.
The fundamental component of such a positioning system is the so-called Space
segment, formed by a satellite constellation. For instance, both GPS and Galileo
use 24 Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites, in the GPS case placed on six
different orbital planes, while Galileo will distribute satellites over three orbits.
The positioning is done in such a way that the users will have, at least, four
satellites simultaneously in view from any point on the Earth surface, and at
any time. The Space Vehicle (SV) Xi is essentially a transmitter broadcasting
continuously, and in a synchronized manner, its Earth Centered Inertial (ECI)
system coordinates (xi, yi, zi), and other information contained into its navigation
signal, si(t). In addition, to achieve synchronization each satellite is equipped
with an highly stable atomic clock, which gives the system current time instant t [2].
Then, there is the so-called Ground-Control segment. It is the infrastructure on
the ground, organized in different centers, which is concerned with tracking and
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Figure 2.1: Vector representation for satellite-receiver distance and position, inspired by [2].
monitoring satellites, and their mission. Its task is essential to a correctly working
system, as a matter of fact the Ground segment monitors satellite health status and
signal integrity, maintains the designed orbital configuration, and updates satellite
navigation data, and satellite clock corrections as it misaligns from t [2].
Finally we have the generic system user R, equipped with its receiver devices,
which constitutes the so-called User segment. Referring to Figure (2.1), r is
the position vector representation in the Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF)
coordinate system (i.e. latitude and longitude rotate with the earth, and has its
origin at the center of the planet) for R, that is as well provided with a crystal
clock oscillator [2].
2.1.1 Position and Timing determination
Each navigation signal si(t) propagates through space in all directions at the
speed of light c, and is captured by R, demodulated and transformed between
the Earth Centered Inertial (ECI) to the Earth Centered Earth Fixed (ECEF)
coordinates to compute r(t).
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The available signal at position R is [9]:
g(r, t) =
∑
i
Aisi
(
t− |ui − r|
c
)
+ w(r, t) (2.1)
where Ai is the attenuation suffered by the signal across the path Xi-R, and w(r,t)
is the receiver background noise.
Both the considered GNSS, in the signal transmission make use of direct sequence
spread spectrum (DSSS) modulation, in order to allow the entire constellation to
broadcast simultaneously on the same carrier. Then, the transmitted signal si(t)
includes its own ranging code - publicly known - and navigation data. The ranging
code, or Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) code, is a periodic sequence of ±1, with
good auto-correlation properties, and if replicated at the receiver side, it allows to
determine the travel time of radio signal from the satellite to R.
Let’s see more in detail how the ranging-code becomes useful in position determi-
nation. We wish to determine the vector r, having ui calculated via the ephemeris
data transmitted by SVi, and the physical signal path
di = ui − r (2.2)
This distance, ‖di‖, can be computed by measuring the propagation time required
for a ranging code to transit from the satellite antenna, to the user receiver antenna.
For instance, the code starting phase generated by the satellite at t1 arrives at the
receiver at t2, resulting in a propagation time
∆t = t2 − t1 (2.3)
Making the assumption that the satellite clock and the receiver clock are perfectly
synchronized, at the receiver an identical coded ranging signal is generated at
t1, this replica is shifted in time until it achieves correlation with the received
satellite-generated ranging code. The correlation process would yield the optimal
estimate of the propagation time, and retrieves the signal level above the noise.
By multiplying this propagation time, ∆t, by the speed of light, the true ‖di‖,
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Figure 2.2: Position triangulation means three in-view satellites.
satellite-to-user geometric range, can be computed:
‖di‖ = ∆t · c (2.4)
However, it is still not enough to compute r(t), since this unknown position is
a vector in R3. Then we should acquire at least three satellite signals, and for each
of them we first compute the corresponding di (for convenience of notation, we
denote by di the vector magnitude) as exposed above, then we find (xi , yi, zi) by
demodulating its de-spread navigation data. It corresponds to triangulating our
position, as depicted in Figure 2.2. We get the following linear system of three
equations, and three variables:

(x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 + (z1 − z)2 = d21
(x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2 + (z2 − z)2 = d22
(x3 − x)2 + (y3 − y)2 + (z3 − z)2 = d23
(2.5)
It is equivalent to draw a sphere around each satellite, with radius equal to the
corresponding di, these will intersect in two points, the receiver will be located at
the earth’s surface closest point.
However, the above described procedure works in the ideal case that transmitter
and receiver are perfectly synchronized.
In order to minimize the receiver costs and dimensions, this latter is equipped
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with a crystal clock, which influenced by environmental conditions drifts relatively
to the stable atomic scale. Consequently we can define a receiver clock offset:
toffset = tR − t (2.6)
which essentially represents the difference between the receiver time, and the true
system time; and a clock drift - the time derivative of the offset. Therefore, R
has only access to an imprecise estimate tR of the system time t, and it actually
receives the signal [9]:
g(r, tR) =
∑
i
Aisi
(
t− |ui − r|
c
+ toffset
)
+ w(r, tR) (2.7)
Because of the lack of synchronization, he can only get what is called pseudorange
- the range determined by multiplying the signal propagation velocity, by the time
difference between two non-synchronized clocks
d˜i =
(‖ui − r‖
c
− toffset
)
· c
= ‖ui − r‖ − toffset · c
= di − toffset · c
= (tR − ttx) · c
(2.8)
where ttx is the signal transmission time measured by the satellite. Notice that
toffset is an additional un-known variable, then with respect to the ideal case we
need an additional equation. Therefore, actually at least four in-view satellites are
required, and the system (2.5) becomes:

(x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2 + (z1 − z)2 = (d˜1 + c · toffset)2
(x2 − x)2 + (y2 − y)2 + (z2 − z)2 = (d˜2 + c · toffset)2
(x3 − x)2 + (y3 − y)2 + (z3 − z)2 = (d˜3 + c · toffset)2
(x4 − x)2 + (y4 − y)2 + (z4 − z)2 = (d˜4 + c · toffset)2
(2.9)
Practically, the toffset introduction is unavoidable since even a small clock error will
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affect severely the positioning. For instance, taking toffset = 1 ms, and multiplying
it by c, the resulting position error is 300 km. Therefore, pseudorange measurement
must exploit at least four Space Vehicle (SV)s, and the corresponding ttx correctly
obtained from navigation, thus one can achieve the exact r(t) and t, even without
requiring a precise local clock.
Then, the GNSS systems are not only a useful tool in position determination,
but can also disseminate time synchronization (with respect to Universal Time
Coordinates (UTC)) between different users worldwide. Furthermore, without
going into details, by exploiting Doppler effect on the received signal frequency
with respect to the nominal one, the user velocity can also be computed [2]. This
explains why it is usual to speak of PNT systems.
2.1.2 Satellite signal
Without reference to a specific system, the basic signal structure is described
in the following. In general, si(t) carries [2]:
1. Navigation-Data Di(t): The waveform Di(t) is a base-band binary signal
which gives us the necessary information to compute a PNT solution. Each
Space Vehicle (SV)i via Di(t) transmits users a timing reference about the
transmission instant, accurate orbital parameters (according to different
services) about its own position in space - ephemeris, and a looser information
on the position of all the constellation satellites - almanac.
2. Spreading-sequence ci(t): The signal transmission occurs simultaneously
from each satellite, then the problem of medium access arises. A TDMA
multiplexing scheme is not suitable because of the simultaneity; while an
FDMA requires a different carrier frequency for each satellite, and hence an
extensive use of spectrum, and expensive multi-frequency receivers. For such
reasons it is only adopted by GLONASS.
Other GNSS systems use Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) for two
reasons. First it enhances the use of spectrum, in fact distributing satellites
into orthogonal channels, it allows them to share the same frequency. And
2.1. BASICS OF GNSS 11
Figure 2.3: The GPS L1 C/A civilian signal generation scheme.
secondly these Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) codes are an aid in pseudorange
computation, as described in 2.1.1. As a consequence, Di(t) multiplies the
corresponding high-rate, and periodic ranging code waveform, ci(t); then the
resulting signal will occupy a wider band, over which its power will be spread,
namely it becomes a wideband transmission.
3. Carrier frequency f0: Finally, the spread-spectrum signal modulates the
system carrier frequency, using a BPSK, or BOC scheme depending on the
specific positioning system. To these systems the so-called Radio Navigation
Satellite Services (RNSS), and recently also the Aeronautical Radio Navigation
Service (ARNS), portions in the L-band are reserved [1]. Furthermore, the
modern navigation systems do not use a single carrier, rather they roughly
have one carrier for each offered service, and therefore these are selected in
order to guarantee inter-operability.
For clarity Figure 2.3 shows how these three components are joined together to
generate the GPS L1 C/A civilian signal si(t). The details of signal generation are
neglected here, however it is worth noting that the power levels of these signals are
different from those of the common terrestrial mobile communications. In fact, the
satellite signal on earth reaches a minimum value of '-160 dBW, depending on
the user elevation angle. The reasons of this signal weakness are the high path-loss
built-up travelling over at least 23000 km. Then, si(r, tR) is so weak that it is
highly vulnerable to any interference and obstacles. After this brief introduction to
GNSS fundamentals, in the following section we will see how a malicious entity
can mount a successful attack.
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2.2 GNSS impairments
When the GNSS signal reaches the ground it is strongly attenuated, so it
becomes vulnerable to even small impairment that degrade the PNT solution
computation.
A first class of impairment is the radio frequency (RF) interference, this can be
either narrowband or wideband, and can be generated by any undesired source.
In our daily life there are a large number of systems [2] that work with RF signal
transmission within the GNSS band. It is inevitable that some out-of-band energy
- due to harmonics, intermodulation products, or a malfunctioning equipment
in adjacent bands - will fall within the range of frequencies processed by GNSS
receivers. The Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) mitigates narrow band
interference, but it is not enough.
Another type of impairment are multipath reflections and shadowing, the former
gives replicas of the desired signal which, depending on their strength, can introduce
error in pseudorange measurement; while the second is an excess attenuation of
the direct path. Multipath signal are mostly generated in urban environments,
then they can be mitigated means either with a well-studied antenna location in
case of fixed-user, or intentionally designed antennas which reject signals arriving
from below the horizon [4]. For sure it is an annoying impairment during the
signal acquisition phase, since correlating the receiver replica with a received signal
made of multiple components, corresponds to multiple correlation peaks that gives
uncertainty about the genuine signal propagation time.
However, these are unintentional interference examples, while interfering signals
intentionally created by someone worry us much more. There are many kinds of
attack, and each one is creating a signal that interferes with the authentic one;
against those we must find a solution, so it is worth to see them in detail.
2.2.1 Attacks on GNSS signal
Because of GNSS requirements, we can define as an attack any action which
affect one of these security properties: integrity, availability and authenticity [2].
The attacks that we are going to describe can be applied to any satellite positioning
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system. Before going on, it has to be highlighted that in all these systems the
positioning signal is broadcast by satellites, and users on earth can only receive it,
that is, they cannot communicate or reply.
Jamming The RF interference may also be intentional, in this case it is called
jamming. It is the most trivial attack, since it does not attempt to locate the user
at a desired wrong position, but simply aims to prevent the position computation,
that is a Denial-Of-Service (DOS) attack, or in other words it affects the system
availability. Basically, the attacker can interfere with a continuous wave (CW), a
pulsed continuous wave (PCW) or white Gaussian noise (AWGN). In any case the
victim is not able to detect or recognise the satellite signal. This attack should not
be underestimated, because small jammers are available at a low price and can
deny GNSS within an area of tens of metres [4].
Forging and modification attacks
In other cases, the aim of the intentional interferer is not just to disrupt GNSS
operation, but rather to manipulate the system such that it produce a false position
r’ of the victim receiver, instead of its actual position r and/or a falsified timing
solution, t′ 6= t [4]. Then, the attacker need access either to the victim receiver (or
rather to its output), or to the channel over which the antenna position is reported
[9]. The practical implementation of the first action corresponds to replacing the
receiver hardware with a device that keeps providing false PNT solutions (e.g. on
the display), and can be controlled via a radio link. In order to provide protection
against this kind of attack, the so-called tamper-resistant receiver are built, whose
output is verified by a cryptographic authentication protocol. The tampering attack
should not be underestimated, since it will be very dangerous if the receiver is
owner of secret material (e.g. the key of the GPS military ranging code).
The second option is to attack the receiver antenna, which provide the electromag-
netic receiver input. The hacker can, for instance, move the receiver antenna, or
place it within a shielded area, along with the use of its own transmitting antenna;
in this manner he can bypass a tamper resistant receiver [9]. This is achievable by
several attack strategies that are listed here below.
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Spoofing The spoofing attack is defined as the broadcast of false GNSS wideband
signals [4]. In this case the attacker imitates the GNSS signal and make the user
believe to be at a different position, thus it is also called Signal-Synthesis attack.
The signal synthesis is made possible by the fact that the message format and
modulation are completely known to everyone. Then, the receiver antenna get the
false waveform g(r’,t), with modified navigation parameters: e.g. the ephemeris,
the clock correction parameters, the Space Vehicle (SV) health indicator, or the
GNSS time. Depending on the particular changing parameters, the attack can have
different impact on PNT solution: the equation system (2.9) may not be solvable,
thus causing a denial of service to the user; or the data is modified in a smarter
way, inducing a desired error in the computed PNT.
Furthermore, if the spoofer is not synchronized with the system, the attack may
be detected since the receiver loses track of the GNSS signal, while synchronized
generators do not introduce jumps in time [4].
Certainly this attack is potentially more damaging than jamming since the receiver
is providing PNT solutions with fairly good signal quality although the position is
false. A possible countermeasure against it is to introduce some randomness into
the navigation message, integrity the legitimate receiver is going to check with the
key. However, in GNSS data integrity is not sufficient to guarantee signal integrity.
Meaconing In GNSS, as we have mentioned above, the timing information plays
an important role. GPS, and in the same manner Galileo, receivers compute their
position from the TOA of the navigation signals. Basically, the receiver uses the
time, tR, it took the navigation signal to reach the user equipment, to compute the
distance between the transmitter and the receiver. As the receiver has a wrong
knowledge of tR, it is corrected by the fourth equation in (2.9).
Hence, an attacker can desire to attack this time dependence introducing a delay
into the TOA. In this sense, meaconing would be the simplest attack: all signals
are acquired by the attacker and later replayed to the receiver, delaying each one
by the same amount of time. Therefore, the received signal becomes [14]:
g(r, tR) =
∑
i
Aisi
(
tR−|ui − r|
c
)
+w(r, tR)+α
∑
i
Aisi
(
tR−|ui − r
′|
c
−d
)
+η(r’, tR−d)
(2.10)
2.2. GNSS IMPAIRMENTS 15
where d>0 is the delay chosen by the attacker, α the replayed signal amplitude
advantage factor, r′ the attacker location, and η(r′ , tR − d) is the attacker receiver
noise possibly added to the delayed signal.
This attack will only result in a different clock offset, that is a time jump; while
the position will be the same. Hence, this simple delay attack is an efficient way
to attack time synchronization (e.g. in time stamping financial operations) but
has no direct impact on positioning. It can only impact positioning if the user is
moving fast and the delay d is very long [4].
Selective-delay attack In comparison to meaconing, in a selective-delay attack
each signal is delayed by a different amount of time. Let’s suppose that the attacker
is at position PA, the legitimate receiver is at position PR, and the attacker wants
to make the receiver believe to be at the false position PF . First, the attacker
receives four signals at the corresponding instants: signals S1 at time t1, S2 at time
t2, S3 at time t3 and S4 at t4 [5]. Now the attacker calculates for each signal Si the
corresponding instant t′i at which the victim will receive the same, if he truly would
be at PF , and the propagation delay t
′′ along the distance from PA to PR. Then,
the attacker retransmits each signal Si with a delay t
′
i − ti − t′′i . To be noticed that
this is possible only if t′i − ti − t′′i is positive, in other words the attacker can only
perform a delay, but not an anticipation.
A time jump may be detectable by the receiver, but the attacker can hide it in
different manners [5]. He can for example jam the receiver until he achieves the
desired offset, or in a smarter way the attacker can slowly introduce an even higher
delay in navigation signal, in order to avoid a fast time offset increase. Once the
receiver has reached the needed time offset, the attacker starts providing the false
position.
Relaying attack This attack is based on the idea of making the victim believe
to be at position PA (attacker position), when he actually is at PR. This becomes
possible, for example, by connecting the legitimate receiver to the attacker’s antenna.
This implies that the hacker has a physical access to the receiver equipment.
Alternatively, if the distance between the two is too large, the attacker will transmit
16 CHAPTER 2. NAVIGATION AND INTERFERING SIGNALS
the data received at PA to PR through another channel. The relaying attack is also
called wormhole attack. However, also in this case the attacker has to pay attention
to not introduce high time difference. And in turn, the receiver can counteract
the attack making it hard the message relay, for instance, using a high-bandwidth
signal, to maximize the cost of forwarding it [9].
Early bit detection attack As we will see in Chapter 3, the cryptographic
message authentication is based on appending to it an authenticator, that is
some unpredictable data. Therefore, it prevents the possibility of forging the
authenticated navigation data before its reception. This means, that the receiver
should before correctly acquire and track the satellite signal, remove the code
and read the bit content in order to know the authentication chunk. However,
the CDMA might give the attacker another possibility. In fact, as we know that
the PRN code spreads the bit over long sequences, and the attacker can attempt
to correlate a shorter code portion to detect the authenticator bits. Once the
unpredictable portion is known as well, the attacker can replay the data toward his
victim, before it will be received authentically, that is with a negative delay [13].
The corresponding probability of success depends on the carrier-to-noise (C/N0)
ratio.
Secure Code Estimation and Replay (SCER) attack Since the (GPS) L1
Coarse/Acquisition (C/A), or Galileo OS signals are publicly known, and the
navigation data is predictable, some more robust technique at the code level are
based on the idea of introducing some kind of randomness within the ranging
sequence [13]. That is, an unpredictable segment w, is inserted into the message
or PRN code, thus they are readable only by legitimate receivers that know the
key, i.e. something similar to the GPS military code, or Galileo Public Regulated
Service (PRS) service. Here the signal decomposition into individual contributions,
gi, becomes difficult without any knowledge of the key, and consequently the
Selective-delay attack is impossible.
However such schemes that use cryptographic protection are vulnerable to Secure
Code Estimation and Replay (SCER) attack: by an high gain antenna the attacker
keeps observing each secret symbol of the received signal in the corresponding
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symbol interval. Thus, the security-code is estimated into wˆ, and immediately
used to simulate the authentic satellite signal. Then, the signal received at the
legitimate receiver position is an overlap of the two:
gi(r, tR) = αwˆisi
(
tR − |ui − r|
c
− d
)
+ wisi
(
tR − |ui − r|
c
)
+ w(r, tR) (2.11)
where d is the sum of processing/transmission delay. In this case the attacker is
able to demodulate the data, and to remove its receiver noise. In other words,
SCER is the early bit detection equivalent at signal layer.
Obviously, the better is the estimate wˆi, greater is the likelihood of success for the
SCER attack. In general, the attacker acts at the physical layer, so that its attack
is independent of the adopted cryptographic scheme. Rather, it only depend on
the chosen instantaneous estimator performance.
In [15] three estimator function performance are analysed. Namely, the maximum
likelihood (ML), the maximum a posteriori (MAP), and the minimum-mean-square-
error (MMSE) estimators. However, in [16] a more optimal attacker estimator has
been derived, jointly with a stronger detection technique.

Chapter 3
A review of possible defenses in
GNSS
Before presenting the current state-of-art about GNSSs signal authentication it
should be noted that:
• In this context cryptography is not always the appropriate tool, or rather
it cannot works alone. As a matter of fact, the navigation data can be
protected by secrecy (e.g. with a secret ranging code), or authenticated by
un-predictable data (e.g adding a message authentication code or a digital
signature); however, GNSS carries also timing information, that is the nav-
igation signal reception time. The traditional cryptography may rend the
navigation signal unusable, but is not able to authenticate it, or rather at
the current time it has not been achieved.
• For the above reason, we will also be interested in physical-layer security,
which exploits the communication medium and does not rely on a higher
layer encryption.
• Usually, signal authentication can be aided by a sender-receiver interaction.
However because of the huge number of potential users, and large distances
this is not possible for satellite navigation systems; then we have to work
with a broadcast scheme.
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Figure 3.1: A general single-antenna spoofing attack scenario.
Furthermore, the GNSS signal defense scenario is so wide that it can be organized
from several points of view. In fact, the spoofing countermeasures can be performed
during different processes (e.g. pre-despreading, acquisition, tracking or position
solution defining), and these can be classified in several manners, for instance it
is common to speak about spoofing detection or spoofing mitigation [4]. However
herein, because of our information security approach, we will define the following
two macro-categories: cryptographic and non-cryptographic mechanisms, which are
further divided into other sub-categories covering three operational layers, namely
the signal processing, data bit and position/navigation solution levels.
From here on, with the term spoofer we will refer to a generic attacker, who
aims to forge, modify or relay an authentic message. To clarify the scenario where
the spoofer should take part, we may refer to Figure 3.1.
3.1 Non-Cryptographic Techniques
In the following we will see a series of checks employed to detect potential
attacks and to verify the received signal consistency [4].
The structure of GNSS OS signals, including the modulation type, PRN sequences,
transmit frequency, signal bandwidth, Doppler range, signal strength and many
other features are publicly known. Thus, an attacker is motivated to mimic
these authentic GNSS signal features; despite sophisticated hacking tools, spoofing
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signals are different from the authentic ones. Therefore the following countermeasure
methods, sensitive to certain GNSS signal statistics, and looking for specific features
that can reveal the spoofer, can defend the receiver [14]. These techniques cannot
replace cryptography, but they can give it a relevant aid, since they have a more
immediate implementation.
3.1.1 PNT solution layer
TOA monitoring the effect of an un-synchronized, or naive attack may be
detectable via a suddenly higher clock offset [4].
Position Jump As a consequence of a poorly-designed spoofing attack, there may
also be a detectable jump of kilometres in a few seconds, namely a position-jump
[4].
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is an algorithm,
implemented at the receiver, that makes use of more than four pseudoranges to
check the PNT solution consistency [4].
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) check If the receiver is equipped with
accelerometers and gyroscopes it is able to obtain a second measurement of the
current position, a discrepancy between the two is index of a spoofing attack [4].
Consistency check with other solutions The user may have access to other
sensors or position references, such as cellular network base stations, or in view
Wi-Fi access points [4].
3.1.2 Data layer
As described in (2.1.2), each Di bit sequence carries information about the
satellite positions (i.e. ephemeris and almanac), and the system clock, therefore
each signal has to be consistent with the others. Furthermore, the receiver may
access an on-line ephemeris database, with which the received signal has to be
consistent.
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3.1.3 Signal processing layer
Received Signal Strength (RSS) monitoring In order to be effective, the
spoofer should generate a correlation peak higher than the authentic signal peak
to mislead the target receiver, but this may result into sharp jumps in the signal
strength. Then, rapid SNR changes should alert the receiver [4].
RSS monitoring with moving receiver The received signal power monitoring
becomes even more effective with moving receivers. Given the relatively short
between spoofer and receiver, any movement between the two leads to detectable
changes in the received power [4].
Different frequencies power level As a design choice, GNSSs assign pre-
defined different power levels to their different frequencies. However, a common
spoofer works at a single frequency, then the attack is going to increase the power
level of that frequency, leaving the rest unaltered [4].
Frequency-phase consistency check In authentic signals the Doppler fre-
quency, and code delay should be consistent because of the satellite-receiver relative
motion, but this property may be neglected by less sophisticated spoofers [4].
Spoofing detection via antenna pattern diversity According to Figure 3.1,
the spoofer is a terrestrial single-antenna transmitter, while the satellites’ signals
are coming from hundreds of kilometres, and crossing different paths. This diversity
in the propagation model can be detected using antennas with complementary
reception patterns [4].
Angle-Of-Arrival check The single antenna attacker may be identified via
antenna-array, which perform a spatial processing. Since antenna-array are an
expensive hardware, the same check can be performed moving a single antenna
along a random trajectory, known as a synthetic antenna-array [4].
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3.1.4 Cooperative Methods
Multiple Fixed Receiver A different spoofing detection approach is based on
the interaction of multiple fixed receivers, located at known relative positions. If
a single-antenna spoofer is attacking the receivers, they will all compute similar
positions, that obviously cannot be if the signal is authentic. The drawback is
that it will require an embedded communication equipment, and an authentication
protocol between different parties, since we need to communicate with trusted
nodes [4]. In conclusion, a receiver cannot implement all these techniques, nor the
check success is even guaranteed with certainty, since it always depends on how
smart and powerful the attacker is [5]. However, a cross check made by a pair
of them will for sure detect potential attacks, that have managed to bypass the
cryptographic authentication.
3.2 Cryptographic Techniques
We move on seeing the defense mechanisms that involve the use of a secret
cryptographic key. Among cryptography goals there is not only message confiden-
tiality and encryption - the science of transforming an original plaintext message
into a coded, and apparently no-sense message, via a suitable key material - but
also information security. The security regards mainly with message (or source)
authentication and integrity protection, that are the aim of this thesis work. Here
follows an introduction to cryptographic concepts and primitives that will be used
throughout this thesis.
Often authentication and integrity protection are seen as coincident, or the second
as a service of the former; but we wish to emphasize the slight conceptual difference
between them.
Message Authentication It allows the sender, A, to transmit a message to its
receiver, B, in such a way that B is sure about the message source. The attacker,
F, is anyone who attempts to forge a message for B, pretending to be A.
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(a) Message Authentication vs. forging attack.
(b) Message Integrity Protection vs modification
attack.
Figure 3.2: The cryptographic settings.
Integrity Protection It ensures that each message is delivered to B in the
same conditions that it was sent out from A — with no bits inserted, removed, or
modified. The attacker, M, is anyone who attempts to modify the message for B,
pretending that the modified message is the original coming from A.
The difference is clear if we suppose that a navigation signal sent by SVi
undergoes a meaconing attack before reaching the legitimate receiver, in this case
it will maintain the data integrity (no bits are changed), but it is not physically
authentic (i.e. it is not coming directly from SVi).
It should be noted that when we speak about authentication it will always refer
to the message, or to its source, but we are not going to treat user authentication,
which aims to prevent unauthorized entities from using the service [11]. For sure,
we would like to deny the service to malicious entities, but such an authentication
service is practically impossible to be implemented for the amount of Open Service
users. Therefore, the alternative is to leave the service open, and available to
anyone, but giving the receiver the certainty about the signal source.
Making reference to the block schemes depicted in Figure 3.2 we are going to see
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how it is possible to achieve cryptographic message authentication and integrity
protection. Let suppose that the legitimate receiver, A, needs to send a message u
to B in an authentic way:
1. Authentication and Integrity Protection: u and the key, k, are fed in
block S(), usually a random function chosen within a publicly defined family,
and identified by the random key k. Thus, S() will returns a new sequence
x. The construction of x depends on the particular scheme, but generally
applies x = {u, t}, that is, a uniquely defined authenticator t is appended
to u. The role of t is ensuring that the message is coming from a legitimate
entity, and none without the key can imitate it, since it is unpredictable
before its reception. S() is the same for both authentication, and integrity
protection purposes.
2. Forging or Modification attack: x is sent over the insecure channel,
indeed before reaching B’s side it may run into an attack. Making reference
to Figure 3.2, there are two potential types of attacker, the first is F (a) who
is interested in forging a new message u′ pretending to be A even though
having no key. The forger attempts to authenticate his u′ into x′ = {u′, t′}
before having observed how x is constructed, that is an ignorant guess. The
second one is M (b), who instead is interested in intercepting, observing and
modifying x into x′, that is, he pretends to have modified the message, and
its authenticator in an authentic way, without having the key.
3. Verification: at the other side of the channel there is B, who is the verifier
and receiver. Whenever he receives a message, either x or x′, this will be
processed by the block V(·,k), a deterministic function which basically reverses
block S(·,k) operation. If the message is coming from A and was not modified,
then the authenticator t˜ computed on the received uˆ, is equal to tˆ coming
from the channel. In this latter case the verification output will be uˆ = u,
and the flag b = OK.
Therefore, both Message Authentication and Integrity Protection services can be
jointly provided by the same mechanism,
(
S(·),V(·)
)
.
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Figure 3.3: S() and V() implementation for MAC computation.
Several authentication schemes exist, which depends not only on the algorithms
S() and V() implementation, but they can also be based on the key role, thus we
can speak about symmetric or asymmetric schemes.
Symmetric-key schemes
In symmetric key authentication techniques A and B share a common secret
key k, by which they authenticate and verify the message, respectively. The types
of function that may be used to produce an authenticator in S(), and to verify it
in V(), can be grouped in three categories [10]:
• Hash function: it is a function that maps a message of arbitrary length into
a fixed length hash value, which serves as authenticator. Furthermore, this
function is easily directly computed but hardly inverted, that is a one-way
function. Usually the key role is to identify the specific transformation.
• Message encryption: here the cyphertext of u serves as its authenticator.
• Message Authentication Code (MAC): it is a function of u and k, that
produce a fixed-length value as authenticator, also called tag. In Figure 3.3
blocks S() and V() are specified for this case.
Now going back to our problem, a symmetric key scheme is not suitable for the
OS service, since it would imply that anyone could create an authentic navigation
signal, as if he/she were the generic satellite SVi. The GNSS OS potential users
are the entire world, while a restricted service (e.g. the very precise military GPS
3.2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUES 27
signal, or PRS in Galileo) has a small set of users, and in this case the deployment
of a symmetric key, kept secret inside few very expensive and tamper-resistant
receivers, is a viable solution.
In order to avoid attacks, it might be an idea to assign each single receiver on the
ground a symmetric key shared only with the satellite, but it would imply that
the satellite needs enough memory to keep all the keys assigned on the ground,
and whenever it broadcast the navigation signal, this will be a multiplex of n
signals addressed to the different n users, although these may not be switched on.
Obviously it would be a huge waste of memory and bandwidth, then it might be
a solution to divide users into groups, and assign to each a different key. In this
case, we should have trust among all users within each group, which is practically
impossible.
Therefore, despite the fact that the symmetric key schemes are preferable in terms
of key length and computational complexity [10], they are too vulnerable to be
implemented in the authentication of GNSS OS signal.
Asymmetric-key schemes
Public-key (or asymmetric-key) cryptography, in contrast to the symmetric one,
involves the use of two separate keys:
• Public key: all participants have access to it. It is used to encrypt for secrecy
purpose, or to verify in authentication and integrity protection.
• Private key: it is generated locally by each participant and need never to be
distributed. It is applied to decrypt the message for secrecy, or to sign the
message for authentication and integrity protection.
The transformation performed by S() or V() depends on the couple of key that
is provided in input, it means that the two keys are distinct but related means a
particular function. Whenever the transmitter refreshes its private key k ∈ K, it
will also compute the corresponding public key
k
′ ∈ K′ : k′ = f(k) (3.1)
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Figure 3.4: The public key verification block.
where f is one-way function, such that the recovery of k by knowledge of k’ is
computational infeasible before its validity expires.
As regards the setting, the idea remains basically unchanged at the authentication
side: where A is the only who know k by which he computes the digital signature
s = T(u, k) (3.2)
and analogously to the symmetric case, it will be appended to u. However, for the
verification we need a re-parametrization of V:
V(m, k) ≡ V′(m, k′) (3.3)
Furthermore, since anyone can verify with k′ it also imply that anyone can forge
a valid digital signature s. In other words, the signing algorithm must not be
available, but only its inverse function has to be:
T′(·, k′) ≡
[
T(·, k)
]−1
(3.4)
T′ : T × K′ → U (3.5)
its correspondent block scheme is depicted in Figure 3.4.
Practically, public-key cryptography has been designed to manage communi-
cations between many users, where symmetric-key storage becomes a memory
overload. Then it appears a suitable solution also for GNSS. In the following
the state-of-art proposals will be introduced, subdivided into distinct operational
layers.
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3.2.1 Asymmetric-key defenses at data-layer
Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) The navigation data authen-
tication and integrity protection service via digital signature is called Navigation
Message Authentication (NMA) [12]. Basically, by making use of a well-studied
algorithm (e.g. RSA), and assigning each satellite a pair of keys (ki,k
′
i), the data
u = Di is digitally signed and accompanied by its Digital Signature (DS),
s = DSi. 1 Precisely, Di makes reference to the most important part of the
message, as ephemeris, time of week (TOW) and week number (WN). NMA for
sure prevents a spoofing attack at data layer, in fact although the navigation data
is predictable, the attacker is not able to forge a new message, accompanied by the
corresponding DS, and bypass the verification algorithm. However, a NMA scheme
has to satisfy some important requirement, listed here below:
1. the DSi overhead: the GNSS channel has a very low bandwidth, for instance
Galileo useful data will be transmitted at 114 bit/s. Then, the DS cannot
overhead excessively, otherwise the waiting for its reception will slow down the
message authentication, and utilization. A longer DS increases the minimum
time needed to detect an attack, namely the Time-To-Alarm (TTA). And
even if the verifier output is positive this long elapsed time can make the
verification useless for some applications, for instance during an aircraft
landing phase;
2. the efficiency of V(): the verification algorithm has to be implemented into
mass-market receivers, then it should be computationally efficient, and should
not require a large amount of power;
3. the fluency of V(): as soon as the signal is received, and processed, the DS
verification step should be very easy and fast, since if an error occurs it must
be given the warning that an attack is ongoing, and avoid the use of a false
PNT solution over a long time;
1Notice that the previous generic notation u and s has been modified into Di, and DSi, in
agreement with the GNSS one.
30 CHAPTER 3. A REVIEW OF POSSIBLE DEFENSES IN GNSS
4. the loss-tolerance: a quite high data-loss is a GNSS channel feature that
cannot be mitigated much. Therefore, if the receiver is moving and some
obstacles prevent data and signature reception, it has to wait for a successive
non shadowed broadcast, by this reason bits allocation and frequency within
the message must be well-studied.
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)
has compiled a list of recommended DS algorithms and corresponding key sizes
and properties [7]. The resulting preferred scheme in terms of level of security
and the small key size is the Elliptic Curve (EC) version of the Schnorr signature,
whose description is omitted here. We are only interested in the fact that although
this algorithm passes a series of cryptanalysis tests, its key size is still large when
compared to a symmetric key Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes for
the same level of security, and high bit-rate is required.
Given the issues risen by the use of DS, in the following we present other techniques
at data layer that attempt to mitigate the problem.
TESLA: a broadcast authentication scheme In [18] an authentication pro-
tocol is proposed for wireless radio broadcast towards a multitude of users, called
Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA). The basic idea
is to use a hybrid protocol: it makes use of a private key to compute Message
Authentication Codes (MACs), but after some time this key is shared with the
receivers, thus it becomes a symmetric (group) key authentication protocol.
Practically, at transmission time the key k is known to the sender only, so he is
the only entity who can compute the correct message MAC. The receiver, who
is not yet able to verify the packet authenticity, buffers all the received packets,
and only a short while later, the sender discloses k and the receiver becomes able
to authenticate the packet. Obviously, the receiver/verifier has to be sure about
the authenticity of k, and TESLA manages this issue via a self authenticating
key-chain. To generate a key-chain the sender first picks a random key kl, to which
he repeatedly applies, for l times, a certain one-way function F, until he gets k0,
which will be the so-called root key. This will be the first key to be used (Figure
3.5), and a digital signature will authenticate it. After its expiration time, k0 is
revealed together with its signature, and the transmitter will start using k1, and so
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on up to kl. While, when ki is disclosed, the receiver can verify if the received key
is genuine by applying i times the one-way function to the received key and check
if the result is equal to the root key, F i(ki) = k0. If F is well-designed (i.e. it is
hard to invert), it is unlikely that an attacker can discover future keys.
FFFF ...
k0k1k2kl−2kl−1kl
Generation
Use
Figure 3.5: The self-authenticating key-chain based on one-way functions.
Therefore, once the key-chain has been generated the broadcast begins:
1. The sender needs to transmit the message Mi, then he uses ki from the
chain and computes ti = MAC(Mi; ki), and sends a packet Pi = [Mi, ti, ki−d],
where d>0 is the established disclosure delay.
2. The receiver captures the packet P ′i = [M
′
i , t
′
i, k
′
i−d], and buffers it while
waiting for the disclosure of ki.
3. Once packet P ′i+d is received, the key k
′
i authenticity is verified by repeating
F up to the last verified chain point kj with 0 ≤ j < i. And if k′i passes
the test, that is kj = F i−j(k
′
i) the receiver computes t
′
i = MAC(M
′
i ; k
′
i), and
compared it with the stored ti.
Therefore, TESLA combines advantages of symmetric and asymmetric protocols,
and seems to satisfy all GNSS peculiar requirements, including loss-tolerance. In
fact, any level of loss is tolerated without retransmissions since the verification step
does not require any chunks of the navigation message. However it has also some
critical aspects:
• the disclosure delay has to be well-designed: it should be at least bigger than
the longest packet propagation time, since once the key is disclosed everyone
can forge an authentic MAC, and a packet received during the key validity
period and carrying a correct MAC is accepted as authentic. So the larger the
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transmission delay, the larger the waiting time to perform verification, and
hence TTA. Therefore, we need a trade-off between these two requirements.
• the second issue regards the key chain: its renewal process needs a deep
analysis. Since the DS transmission is not costless in terms of bandwidth, it
is better to change it rarely. However, if we had transmitted the chain-root a
long time ago and the root-key is not still transmitted, a receiver who has just
turned-on is not able to authenticate the chain, nor the navigation message;
then the service is not available.
Even with the issues discussed above, in the literature TESLA is considered a
promising solution for GNSS data authentication. In [19] a possible protocol
application to Galileo OS message structure is proposed, and interesting solutions
are provided to speed up the verification step, and to cope the lossy channel.
Briefly, the author suggest to use a unique key-chain for the entire set of system
SVs, and that each one sends out MAC referring to other SVs messages; moreover
the authentication is only done on the message part that changes less frequently.
On the contrary, the proposal in [20] carries some differences: for instance they
use a unique key-chain but with different keys for each SV, and the key length
is extended at the cost of a shorter MAC. As regards the chain renewal, the
authors propose to use a public-key certificate scheme, however no further details
are provided.
Digital Signature Amortization (SigAm) A second solution to mitigate DS
transmission overhead can be derived from a proposal [21] oriented to Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSN), another example of broadcast communication even more
widespread. The proposal is based on the idea of using only one Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature to authenticate a sequence of
broadcast messages; therefore, each broadcast packet contributes to the DS overhead
amortization.
Whenever the transmitter needs to broadcast a series of packets in an authentic
way he performs the following steps, depicted in Figure 3.6:
1. The transmitter picks a first random digest Hk+1,
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Figure 3.6: Digital signature amortization authentication-chain.
2. Hk+1 is appended to message Mk, and a hash function is applied on this
entire block EBk = [ Mk, Hk+1]; the result is the new digest Hk
3. He repeats the operation of the previous point on the new block
EBk−1 = [ Mk−1, Hk], and so on until he reaches H1
4. At this point the sender signs the last digest H1 via its own private key k,
and builds the block: EB0 = [ DS(H1, k), H1]
As soon as the chain is constructed the sender starts broadcasting the blocks in the
reverse order, that is starting from EB0. In turn, the receivers verify the authen-
ticity of H1 with k′, if authentic it will give the following messages authentication.
Therefore, SigAm makes use of a self-authenticating chain in a similar manner
to TESLA, but with the important difference that in this case the user needs
not to wait before performing the verification. Then, it can provides a real-time
authentication. On the other hand, the transmitter needs to generate and collect
all the messages M1...Mk, before he can start transmitting EB0. This is not a
problem with GNSS in general, since the transmitter can compute its messages
well in advance.
However, currently none has tested SigAm on GNSS, and a future application of
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it will require a detailed study of how to move from one chain to the new one, in
order to guarantee authentication continuity. Another issue one have to face is the
likely data loss, making use of the chain defined above, a similar event if occurs will
block the authentication. Then, it apparently seems a good proposal for broadcast
authentication, but we cannot say too much about whether it is, or not a viable
solution in GNSS.
In conclusion, the data-layer defense techniques, just listed here, can give us
navigation message authentication and integrity protection with a security level
just higher than the best known computational attack by pre-pending or appending
to the message a security chunk like a MAC or DS. Practically, employing one of
these techniques we can be sure about the fact that the message content has been
received as given by the system.
However, no authentication about the path genuineness is provided, then meaconing,
and selective-delay attacks are still a threat. In addition, even if NMA introduces
unpredictable bits within the message, if C/N0 is sufficiently high for the attacker
an early bit detection attack can be performed successfully.
3.2.2 Signal-layer defenses
Because of the receiver clock uncertainty, the TOA ranging is an important
information that the user should be able to trust. In other words, physical-layer
authentication has to provide certainty about the signal point of origin, and relation
between the measured time-of-flight and the geometric path from the origin to the
user.
Ideally, to ensure signal origin authentication, the signal should contain something
which is infeasible for an attacker to generate independently, but easily verifiable
by the user [19]. As regards the TOA authentication, a solution should make it
difficult for an untrusted entity to observe an re-broadcast the signal without being
detected [19]. However, this is complicated by the one-way communication, and
unfortunately the attacker can manipulate the signal path in several ways, but at
the moment appears that none cryptographic technique can prevent it completely.
In the following we are going to see the actual proposals state-of-art.
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Figure 3.7: Hidden-Markers transmission and their disclosure scheduling.
Spreading Code Encryption (SCE) The Spreading Code Encryption (SCE)
is based on the idea of reducing the signal observability from an attacker point
of view [19]. Practically, it is achieved using a cryptographic spreading sequence,
so that, when the signal is arrived on ground it is covered by the noise, and
without knowledge of the spreading sequence the correlation aided detection, and
the sequent rebroadcast with a desired delay, are impractical.
This is inspired by the Denial-Of-Service protection applied to the military GPS
signal, however it can also be employed to give source authentication. Obviously,
when the key validity expires it is disclosed in a way similar to TESLA, and anyone
can generate the sequence replica, correlate it with the sampled received signal (that
is only possible if it is authentic), and compute the PNT solution. In [19] a SCE
implementation for Galileo is proposed, which would give real-time authentication
to Commercial Service (CS) users, and delayed authentication to OS users.
However, this technique does not prevent a meaconing (i.e. the application of
a delay, regardless which is the individual signal), and a sufficiently motivated
adversary equipped with an high gain directional antenna, may performs a SCER
attack, and a consequently selective-delay attack.
Hidden Markers In [9] the author proposes a watermarking technique to au-
thenticate the signal: it hides digital information in a carrier signal to prove the
identity of the owner. The receiver having some information about the watermark
can check its authenticity, and accept it with.
Basically, each transmitter SVi has a predefined time instant tm at which it trans-
mits its hidden marker as a rectangular pulse of length δ, as depicted in Figure 3.7.
These hidden markers are a secret spread sequence, whose power spectral density is
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below that of noise by 20 dB. At the time of transmission and reception the marker
is secret, and any receiver can only digitize and buffer the entire signal. Therefore,
the TOA information carried by the marker is not accessible yet. After a delay ρ
(larger than the local clock toffset) the spreading sequence information is publicly
revealed in an authentic way, so that all receivers can construct the hidden marker
replica and correlate it with the buffered stream. This correlation process reveals
the propagation time τm, or rather the pseudorange and if it is smaller than ρ it is
useful to compute the PNT solution. It may occurs that other secondary peaks
are revealed: if it is smaller than the main peak of a certain threshold it may be
a multipath effect. While, if this peak delay is greater than ρ it is likely to come
from an attacker, that has reproduced the marker after its disclosure.
Therefore, the hidden marker is robust against signal-synthesis attack. However,
this apparently smart trick is underestimating a well-equipped attacker who can
use a very high directive antenna means which he can recognise the marker and
apply to it a selective-delay attack.
3.2.3 Cooperative methods
As already seen for the non-cryptographic methods, there is the possibility of
an interaction between the user and a third entity, e.g. a server. Obviously, this is
a no stand-alone receiver.
In [22] the authors developed a signal authentication strategy that makes use of the
hidden broadcast component. That is, GPS P(Y) or the Galileo Public Regulated
Service (PRS) signals are encrypted, and are robust against spoofing. The proposal
is to provide the anti-spoofing benefits of secret signals, without having access
to the codes themselves. The [22] makes reference to GPS, where the military
signal is modulated on the same carrier, L1, with respect to civil signal, but it is
orthogonal to the latter. Basically, the user at location r1, and the server at r2
record the GPS signal, and the former send to the reference station a data-set with
the corresponding time-stamp. After some pre-processing steps, the server who
has access to the secret code correlates the two quadrature-channels; and slides
the window until a sufficient great peak is found. This joint processing provides
signal authentication and position verification - the peak appearance guarantees
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the hidden component presence, which is consider difficult to be imitated. And the
comparison between the two signals reveals the user-to-server position, which has
to be consistent with the well-known r2.
A similar work is presented in [23] for Galileo signals. The drawback is that also
this technique is not robust against all kinds of attacker; a SCER attack by which
the attacker can try to estimate on the flight the secret spreading code and use
this estimated version for his replica remains a threat.
In conclusion, we have seen that there is a common awareness about the need
to find a solution toward the GNSS Open Service signal authentication, and how it
is inevitable to work on several levels. However, although there are many smart
and interesting proposals, none is worrying about being unconditionally secure
against the capabilities of a generic attacker, thus they may be robust against a
specific form of attack, but not enough for another. Formally, they are providing
a computationally secure authentication and integrity protection, since all NMA
techniques are based on a key which is mathematically difficult to be retrieved in
time, while the signal layers mechanism works against a poor equipped attacker.
That is, they rely on all current computational power of computers and the hardware
performance.
Instead this thesis would contribute to the problem identifying a universal bound,
which guarantee authentication against any type of attack.

Chapter 4
An introduction to Galileo
System
Since the current work is focused on the Galileo OS signal authentication, a
brief introduction to the system is needed.
Galileo is a civilian GNSS, developed by the collaboration between the European
Union and the European Space Agency (ESA), that will not interfere with GPS
but instead it will offer compatibility and interoperability. At the current time
GPS provides solution precision which varies widely depending on the location,
and there is no guarantee of service continuity. Then, Galileo aims at providing a
minimal position computation error of 4 m which corresponds to a 95% horizontal
accuracy, along with a 99% service availability [6].
Furthermore, Galileo will allow its users to select among five different services:
1. Open Service (OS): It provides freely positioning and synchronization
information to the mass market users;
2. Safety Of Life (SOL): This service is targeted to application strictly
concerned with the human life, such as aviation. It has the same OS precision
but will automatically inform users of a failure of any satellite or similar
problem affecting performance. This service is already implemented by
EGNOS, then Galileo will improve its performance by means of OS signals
and/or in cooperation with other satellite navigation systems;
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Figure 4.1: Galileo frequency plan [1]
.
Band Carrier Frequency [MHz]
E1 1575.420
E5a 1176.450
E5b 1207.140
E6 1278.750s
Table 4.1: Galileo carrier frequencies.
3. Commercial Service (CS): It allows to professional or commercial applica-
tions an improved performance than that obtained through the open service,
its access is limited by cryptography;
4. Public Regulated Service (PRS): Means encryption, this service is re-
stricted to government-authorised users, for sensitive applications which
require a high level of service continuity and an higher robustness;
5. Search and Rescue Service (SAR): Galileo’s worldwide search and rescue
service will help to forward distress signals to a rescue coordination centre by
detecting emergency signals transmitted by beacons, and relaying messages
to them.
4.0.1 Signal Structure
We are mainly interested in signal structure, since some of its specifications
have been used herein and later will be recalled.
The Galileo navigation signals are transmitted in four frequency bands, namely E1,
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Service E1 E5 E6
Open Service X X
Safety-Of-Life X X
Commercial Service X X
Public Regulated Service X X
Table 4.2: Galileo services frequency bands.
E5a, E5b and E6; this band plan is reported in Figure 4.1, where it is compared
with the GPS one, while Table 4.1 gives the Galileo distinct signals carriers.
The spectrum allocation is designed to guarantee interoperability with GPS, and
receivers compatibility. Therefore, it is necessary that the band middle portion
is the same, this is the case for E1 and L1 bands. However, to achieve spectral
separation Galileo signals are transmitted using digital modulation techniques
different from the BPSK of GPS [6].
While as regards the service frequency assignment, they are schematically reported
in Table 4.2, but a detailed description goes beyond the interests of this thesis.
The transmitted signals are Right-Hand Circularly Polarized (RHCP), and should
be noticed that since each satellite is transmitting on each frequency, CDMA is
still adopted as medium access method.
E1 signal
We are going to see more in detail only the OS component carried over band
E1.
The E1 signal is made of three channels, called A, B, and C. E1-A is a PRS
signal, whose ranging codes and navigation data are encrypted. While the OS
signal occupies both channel B and C. Over the former component, B, we have the
navigation data (multiplied by the spreading sequence), while channel C carries
a data-free signal. This is called pilot signal, and is a new aspect with respect to
GPS, it is made of a ranging code only, not modulated by a navigation data stream,
which allows an enhanced signal acquisition and tracking. The E1-B ranging code
has a 4092 chips length, with a 1.023 MHz chipping rate giving it a repetition rate
of 4 ms; while on the pilot signal a secondary code of length 25 chips is combined
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with the primary by ⊕ (i.e. XOR). This code extension to 100 ms allows the
receiver to solve the signal isolation also in worst situations.
Over channel B the satellite ranging code will be multiplied by the corresponding
Data stream - I/NAV - of 250 bit/s (i.e. including navigation data and FEC bits),
consequently Tbit equals the spreading sequence period. While a GPS symbol
length covers 4 sequence periods. The following equations give the mathematical
description of these raw signal versions [1]:
eE1−B(t) =
+∞∑
i=−∞
[
cE1−B,|i|LE1−BDE1−B,[i]DCE1−B rectTc,E1−B(t− iTc,E1−B)
]
eE1−C(t) =
+∞∑
i=−∞
[
cE1−C,|i|LE1−C rectTc,E1−C (t− iTc,E1−C)
]
where L stands for the ranging code repetition rate, DC is the number of code
chips per symbol, and [i]DC gives the integer part of i/DC. The following step is
the carrier modulation in accordance with the BOC scheme, which first requires an
introduction.
Signal modulation The interoperability requirement within the same band, and
the BPSK signals interference mitigation have risen the modulation issue, by this
reason the Binary Offset Carrier (BOC) scheme, has been developed. The BPSK
spectrum has a sinc shape, which is mainly positioned around the carrier frequency,
then Galileo needs a modulation that move the signal energy further away from the
carrier. The generic BOC(fs, fc) modulation makes use of a square wave subcarrier
s(t)BOC = s(t)sign(sin(2pifst)) (4.1)
where s(t) is the square wave resulting after the spreading sequence (of chip rate
fc) application. In the frequency domain, s(t)BOC has a power spectral density
approximated as follows:
GBOC(f) ' G(f − fs)−G(f + fs) (4.2)
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Figure 4.2: E1 Open Service CBOC signal scheme [1]
.
where G(f) is s(t) Fourier transform. This shows that the power is shifted of fs
from the band center. As already mentioned, a generic BOC waveform is denoted
via BOC(fs, fc), where the former is the sub-carrier frequency, while fc is the chip
rate; or via BOC(fs/fc, fc/fc) = BOC(m,n). For instance a BOC(1,1) is similar to
a Manchester code, that is, in digital domain, a 1 is encoded as a [+1-1] sequence,
and a 0 is encoded as a [-1+1] sequence.
Then, eE1−B(t) and eE1−C(t) are modulated in anti-phase via the sums of two
BOC subcarriers as depicted in Figure 4.2, which is actually called CBOC. Where
scE1−Y,a = BOC(1, 1) and scE1−Y,b = BOC(6, 1), and are added via a weighted
sum that set α =
√
10
11 and β =
√
1
11 , then the Galileo E1-OS signal power spectral
density is equal to the GPS one when data and pilot channels are computed together.
Practically, we obtain the following signal:
sE1(t) =
1√
2
(
eE1−B(t)(αscE1−B,a(t) + βscE1−B,b(t))
)
− 1√
2
(
eE1−C(t)(αscE1−C,a(t)− βscE1−C,b(t))
)
(4.3)
note that pilot and data component are modulated with a 50% power sharing.
Actually, in the given equations and schemes is missing the PRS channel A, which
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Figure 4.3: The E1 band spectrum for Galileo and all GPS signals (currently used and
modernized) [1].
is modulated in-quadrature as showed in Figure 4.3; here is also highlighted how
the two systems spectrum are centred around the same carrier to be interoperable,
but the corresponding main lobes are not overlapping thanks to BOC modulation.
Power and Noise levels The Galileo authority for the E1 OS signal guarantees
a minimum received power on ground equal to -157 dBW, which is measured at
the output of an ideally matched RHCP 0 dBi polarized user receiving antenna,
when the satellite elevation angle is higher than 10 degrees.
While the noise power density depends on the receiver noise temperature:
N0 = kTeq = kT0 (4.4)
where k is the Boltzman constant, and T0 is the typical receiver noise temperature
equal to ' 300 K◦. Then, we have N0 ' -204 dBW/Hz = -174 dBm/Hz, and a
consequently carrier-to-noise ratio C
N0
= -157dBW + 30 dBW - (-174 dBm/Hz) '
47 dBW/Hz. Notice that the corresponding signal power density, C/B, where B
= 1.023 MHz (the chip rate), corresponds to -217 dBW/Hz. That is, a unit gain
receiver antenna is not able to distinguish the signal spectrum.
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4.0.2 Message structure
The data bit stream Di(t) can be structured depending on three different
message type:
• F/NAV: used for OS over the E5a signal;
• I/NAV: used for OS, SOL and CS over the E5b and E1-B signals;
• C/NAV: used for CS over the E6-B signal.
According to our chosen service, and working frequency, we will make reference
to I/NAV, namely the Integrity Navigation Message. It is a stream of Frames -
each lasting 720 s - which in turn are made of 24 Sub-frames of 30 s each, and
finally one of this cover 15 Pages each lasting 2 s [1]. This is the elementary
message component, and it can be nominal - for normal operation conditions, or
of alert type, which provides parameters to compute the integrity risk to support
Safety-of-Life applications.
There are several new aspects in comparison to GPS L1 message, for instance
during transmission the pages are swapping between both OS frequencies, in order
to allow a fast data reception to a dual frequency receiver, and leaving to the old
model receiver an unchanged receiving time (i.e. 30 seconds for the complete SV
ephemeris data). Bits allocation within pages is here neglected, because the current
work does not work at this level.

Chapter 5
Derivation of bounds on the key
size
Within this chapter the theoretical analysis performed at the Physical-Layer will
be outlined. In fact we are going to search for a Physical Layer authentication, that
is a fundamentally different paradigm where the security is achieved by exploiting
the physical layer properties of the communication system, such as thermal noise,
interference, and the time-varying nature of fading channels. This work aims to
identify theoretical bounds for having unconditionally secure authentication and
integrity protection of message and signal, that is, regardless of the computational
capabilities of the attacker. Clearly, it is a completely different approach from those
seen in section 3.2, and its strength lies on Information Theoretic foundations. As
a consequence, there will be a large use of Information Theory concepts, as entropy,
H, and mutual information, I, of random variables.
Therefore, taking a general symmetric-key scheme defined by its spaces ( e.g.
relative to message, tag and key), algorithms (e.g S and V) and distributions
(
M,K,X , S,V, pu, px
)
we are going on stating when it is unconditionally secure.
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Unconditionally secure message authentication: The scheme provides
 − unconditionally secure source authentication, if for any forging attack
(pu′ , px′|u′) its probability of success is  upper-bounded.
PSF = P{V (x′ , k) = (u′ , ok)} ≤ F (5.1)
It can be proved that, the necessary condition for having −unconditionally secure
source authentication is
H(k) ≥ log1/2 F (5.2)
where H(k) is the key entropy, measured in bits. Alternatively, by using the mutual
information between k and x, I(k;x) (i.e. the key leakage), and the key entropy
conditioned on the observed x, we have H(k) = I(k, x)+H(k|x); a tighter condition
is [24]:
I(k, x) ≥ log1/2 F (5.3)
Unconditionally secure message integrity protection: The scheme pro-
vides − unconditionally secure message integrity protection, if for any modifi-
cation attack (px′|x) its probability of success is  upper-bounded.
PSM = P{V (x′ , k) = (u′ , ok) ∧ (u′ 6= u)} ≤ M (5.4)
Analogously to authentication, a necessary condition for −unconditionally secure
message integrity protection is [24]:
H(k|x) ≥ log1/2 M (5.5)
Then, in authentication the cheating probability can never be reduced to zero, but
it can only be made arbitrarily small by using a secret key of sufficient size [24].
5.1 Navigation data authentication at the physical-
layer
The first issue that we are going to treat is the search for a theoretical bound
to the data authentication and integrity protection. This analysis has been ac-
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Figure 5.1: The authentication channel model.
complished in two steps, first with a simple, ideal scheme (i.e. noiseless) has been
considered, and secondly using the former result, a more realistic case has been
considered.
From here onwards, in accordance with the traditional terminology in the security
literature, we consider three different agents: Alice, Bob and Eve. In particular,
Alice is the legitimate transmitter who starts the communication, Bob is the in-
tended receiver and Eve is the adversary who transmits toward Bob with the aim
of impersonating Alice.
5.1.1 The noiseless channel model
We start our analysis with the simplified channel model in Figure 5.1 taken
from [24] analysis, made of:
1. a noiseless public channel over which Alice transmits sequences of i.i.d.
symbols such x = (x1, ..., xn);
2. a noiseless private-authentic channel used for sharing the correct and authentic
key k with Bob.
Since x crosses a public channel, it may incur an attack (forging/modification), and
the received sequence, y, at Bob side may be changed. Since, we are interested in
dimensioning a key that will guarantee message authentication, as well as integrity
protection, joining (5.3) and (5.5) results in:
H(k) ≥ log1/2 F + log1/2 M (5.6)
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However, (5.6) holds for a single message authentication, while in order to be as
generic as possible, we are interested in finding a bound that holds for repeated
authentication with the same k. Let’s suppose that for ` consecutive authentication
rounds we exploit the same key, the corresponding key entropy is:
H(k) = I(k,x1) + ...+ I(k,x`|x1, ...x`−1) +H(k|x1, ...x`) (5.7)
Since each observed xi restricts the set within which the correct key should be
searched, we must treat the increasing key-leakage, or equivalently the decreasing
key entropy.
Each message xi should be highly correlated with k, in order to allow Bob to
correctly verify its authenticity through the key. Consequently, to defeat any forging
attack, each mutual information term contained in (5.7) has to be lower bounded
by log1/2 F .
While, against a modification attack we can consider the following chain rule:
H(k|x1) ≥ H(k|x1, ...,xi) ≥ H(k|x1, ...,xi+1) ≥ H(k|x1, ...,x`) (5.8)
Then, in general to satisfy both (5.5) and (5.8), it results:
H(k|x1, ...,xi) ≥ log1/2 M , ∀ i = 1, ..., ` (5.9)
Therefore, taking into account the highest accepted success probability and (5.7),
the resulting minimal key entropy is:
H(k) ≥ ` log1/2 F +
(
log1/2 M
)
(5.10)
Basically, setting a desired maximum accepted success probability of the attack, and
the key renewal period (`), this formula, derived in [24], provides us the minimum
key entropy (e.g. bits length).
Furthermore, as outlined in section 3.2, the single message x is generally defined
as the pair (u, t). As regards the construction of t, we adopt a Wegman-Carter
scheme, that is the authentication and integrity protection equivalent of one-time-
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pad. The fundamental block in this scheme is called an -almost strongly universal
hash function. That is a set, H, of maps between the finite setsM and T with the
two following properties [25]:
1. The number of hash functions in H that takes u1 ∈M, to t1 ∈ T is exactly
|H|/|T |,
2. The fraction of those functions that also takes u2 6= u1 inM to t2 ∈ T and
t2 = t1, is no more than 
Such a defined H states that all values of the tag are equally likely if the key
is unknown, and even if one message-tag pair is observed, all values of tags
corresponding to a forged or modified message are still equally likely. Therefore, by
setting |T | = 1/ F , we can state that Wegman-Carter achieves tightly the forging
attack bound. The same, does not hold for the modification attack, then M is a
looser bound.
5.1.2 The noisy wiretap channel model
Since the real-world channels are noisy, and in a radio-communication such
as the satellite one, it is impossible to neglect the noise, we have to consider a
more suitable model. Because of our requirements, we have found suitable the
authentication-channel model proposed in [26], and depicted in Figure 5.2. It has
three components:
1. A noiseless, one-way public channel, that goes from Alice, to Bob through
Eve. Over this channel Alice transmits the message s, which may be u or an
equivalent version of it;
2. A wiretap channel, made of three branches and thus defined: X → (Y,Z),
where X is the input alphabet, Y is the output alphabet at the legitimate
receiver, and Z is the output alphabet at the wiretapper. The first branch is
the main discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W1 : X → Y , then there is a
second DMC, W2 : X → Z, and a noiseless channel links Eve to Bob;
3. A private, noiseless, and authenticated channel over which Alice shares a
secret key with Bob.
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Figure 5.2: The authentication channel model [26].
With comparison to the former case, the main difference is the introduction of
the wire-tap channel. This latter was firstly developed by Wyner, who aimed to
provide information-theoretic secrecy assuming that the link Alice-Eve was noisier
than the main one. This setting has become particularly useful for information and
coding purposes, then it has been exploited also for authentication. Then, in [27]
a wiretap channel is used to hide by noise the authenticating key, but in all the
current literature it is always assumed that mutual informations satisfy
I(x,y) > I(x, z)
In other words, the channel toward the legitimate receiver is less noisy. On the
other hand, as already stated, we aim to find a theoretical bound assuming that
Eve has unbounded computing resources, and a good hardware equipment (e.g.
a low-noise receiver, or an high antenna). Therefore, using the preceding result,
(5.10), and adding new requirements imposed by the actual setting, we are going to
dimension the needed key size for a generic authentication and integrity protection
protocol.
Since whenever Alice wishes to transmit a message u ∈ M to Bob in an
authentic way, she has to split message and authenticator between the public
noiseless channel (e.g. an Internet connection that makes use of error correcting
mechanism), and the wiretap noisy channel (e.g. the satellite channel in our
scenario), the communication reliability is ensured by the following condition:
C0 + nI(x, y) ≥ H(u) +H(tag) (5.11)
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where C0 is the public channel capacity, and analogously the wiretap channel
capacity is expressed as nI(x, y) - the maximal mutual information on the single
symbol, multiplied by the x sequence length. In other words, the two capacities
joined together must contain at least the minimum message and the corresponding
authenticator lengths, that is their entropies. How the pair (u, x) should be divided
requires an optimization, since we are asking for two opposites requirements, on
one hand we wish to minimize the wiretap usage since Bob will receive a degraded
copy, but at the same time we have to keep negligible the probability of a successful
attack by Eve, that is a low noiseless channel exploitation.
The second needed requirement regards the desired level of security, then the
(5.10) becomes:
H(k) ≥ log1/2 M + `
(
log1/2 F + n
[
I(x, z)− I(x, y)
]+)
(5.12)
where as previously ` stands for the number of repeated authentications via the
same key, while n is the number of symbols sent over the noisy channel. In (5.12), F
and M represent the maximal accepted forging or modification success probability,
while the new term n
[
I(x, z) − I(x, y)
]+
is a consequence of the noisy wiretap
usage. That is, this latter is an index of the additional key bits needed against the
noise that affects y - it is as if the key provides Forward Error Correction (FEC)
capability. Notice that only positive values of I(x, z) − I(x, y) are considered,
in other words it is an equally capable attacker assumption. For other values of
[I(x, z)− I(x, y)], (5.10) holds again, namely:
• I(x, z) − I(x, y) = 0 ⇒ is equivalent to the noiseless public channel case,
where both y and z carry the same amount of information about x, unless
Eve performs an active attack;
• I(x, z)− I(x, y) < 0 ⇒ it means that Eve is less capable than Bob, and she
is not able to retrieve useful information from z. Then, the task of k is only
to enable verification, but no redundant bits are needed for error correction.
Going back to our primary aim, that is searching for the theoretical size for a
multi-messages authenticating secret key; we will join together requirements (5.11)
and (5.12). Their parameters, as C0, and H(u) depend on the adopted channel
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and message input alphabet, while F , M and H(tag) give us the desired security
level. Furthermore, since the unconditionally secure scheme of Wegman-Carter set
H(tag) = log1/2 F , then it can be suitable taking the tag entropy at least equal to
this logarithm. Therefore the only un-known value is the sequence length n, from
the reliability requirement is preferable to take it has higher as possible, but on
the other hand it will implies an increasing key size. Then, once all the rest has
been fixed, the linear system will delete the n dependency. From the (5.11) one
find that:
n ≥ H(u) + log1/2 F − C0
I(x, y)
And substituting it into (5.12), it results:
H(k) ≥ log1/2 M + `
(
log1/2 F +
H(u) + log1/2 F − C0
I(x, y)
[
I(x, z)− I(x, y)
]+)
= log1/2 M + `
(
log1/2 F + (H(u) + log1/2 F − C0)
[
I(x, z)
I(x, y) − 1
]+)
Therefore, we get that the key entropy per authentication round is lower-bounded
as follow
H(k)
`
≥ log1/2 M + log1/2 F +
[
H(u) + log1/2 F − C0
](
I(x, z)
I(x, y) − 1
)+
(5.13)
Thus, finally we have get a theoretical bound on the key entropy (i.e. minimal
size) which guarantees us the desired security level regardless the particular au-
thentication and integrity protection protocol adopted, that only depends on how
much we use the wiretap channel, and Eve’s advantage.
Notice that this idea imply a symmetric key authentication scheme, and as already
highlighted, it is quite infeasible in GNSS, therefore it is assumed that k will be
disclosed by a broadcast scheme after a while. After that, everyone will know
exactly the chosen k, thus it appears in contrast with the initial hypothesis of using
a private channel to reveal the key. However, the channel is private as meaning
that the key is not available to Eve at the useful instant, but instead when it is no
more valid.
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Figure 5.3: The replay-attack scenario against channel authentication.
In conclusion, via a key k such defined we are providing navigation data authen-
tication and integrity protection, that is Bob is ensured about the bit content
authenticity. Then, any forging or modification attempt is inhibited, but Eve has
the freedom to mount any kind of replay attack. The latter requires a signal layer
defense.
5.2 Signal authentication at the physical-layer
As already highlighted, the signal geometrical path, and the consequently time-
of-arrival authentication is the most critical aspect of the problem.
The techniques listed in (3.2.2) were focused on authenticating the signal via secret
spreading sequences, water-marking or other way of modifying the signal such
that the imitation or recognition of it are hard. However, we have also seen that
these mechanisms do not defeat high gain antennas. Therefore, once again herein
we have tried a different way. Namely, the idea is taken from wireless physical
layer security, and is based on channel authentication. As a matter of fact, two
signals with the same origin (e.g. the satellite) and end vertex (e.g. the legitimate
receiver), but different path in the middle are distinguishable at the physical layer
because of different channel effects. Then, the channel impulse response can be
used to provide the radio channel authentication, that is a link signature.
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5.2.1 The channel authentication scenario
Figure 5.3 depicts a generic replay-attack scenario, where s is the sequence
broadcast by the satellite, and its received copy depends on the receiver location,
and additive noise, here called w and η. Therefore, three different signals can be
defined:
• the signal legitimately received at Bob’s location
rB =
(
s ∗ gAB
)
+ w (5.14)
• the signal received at Eve’s location
rE =
(
s ∗ gAE
)
+ η = s′ (5.15)
• the signal received at Bob location, as replayed by Eve
r′B =
(
s′ ∗ gEB
)
+ w (5.16)
In order to defeat any replay attack, we can think about taking a reference
evaluation of the channel gAB, and for each signal received during the validity of
the reference estimate, we are going to repeat the channel estimation, and if the
current estimation is consistent with the reference one, the signal will be accepted
as authentic. Obviously, this idea requires a certain channel staticity, and the
knowledge of the original transmitted signal, but we will deal with these hypotheses
later. It is however important to note that this technique leads to a new form
of attack, called mimicry attack [28], which aim to rend rB = r
′
B. Basically, Eve
action can take place with two steps:
• At the beginning of the coherence time interval, she can act in a way that
Bob computes the reference estimation over the replay-attack channel, that
is gAE ∗ gEB. In this manner, during all the coherence time she can perform
a replay-attack, and each signal such received will pass the verification test.
• By assuming that Eve has been able to estimate ˜gAB, then in order to make
rB = r
′
B having the same input signal, Eve must make gAE ∗ gEB ∗ h = ˜gAB
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[29]. Where h may be the result of a processing performed over rE, or of a
physical antenna motion. Then r′B will be considered authentic.
To protect ourselves against this kind of attack the cryptography is applied. Practi-
cally, we can design the signal s of Figure 5.3 as a training sequence, which may be
sent over a fourth new OS component (e.g. E1-D). In order to defeat Eve’s actions,
s must have the following properties:
• it has maximum differential entropy, that is, the training sequence is Gaussian.
Therefore, even if Eve passively observes rB, it is difficult to estimate the
channel gAB impulse response in time to forge her channel;
• after a while, any receiver can reconstruct it via a key, and with the previously
received sequence he estimate his own channel reference impulse response.
The key is disclosed over a noiseless, and authenticated channel - then Bob
does not risk to use a fake training sequence.
With such a defined training sequence, Eve cannot remove η and demodulate her rE,
since this latter is the sum of two random and independent Gaussian. Therefore, to
retrieve s is quite infeasible without knowledge of the key, and the only possibility
for Eve is to keep η very low, and forward rE as defined in (5.16). Therefore, we
are not going to bound Eve’s skills and equipment, Bob will recover any type of
disadvantage by means of the key. Here below an example of this approach will be
explained, and the theoretical key size will be computed.
5.2.2 The single-tap impulse response
In the following we are going to use simple but effective hypothesis which show
the robustness against the strongest attack by Eve. Making reference to Figure
5.3 scenario, both Bob and Eve are not moving, while as regards the legitimate
channel, gAB, it is designed as a single-tap of unitary amplitude, whose only effect
is a propagation time delay:
gAB = δ(t− τAB)
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that is, there are not any multipath or attenuation effect. Obviously, it is not a
realistic channel, but sufficient to show the effectiveness of our idea. Furthermore,
here it is assumed that Bob has already estimated gAB; and we allow Eve to
carry out her aim, that is, to imitate gAB. Knowing which is the purpose of
Eve, let us assume that in some way she has been able to estimate gAB, then
since the signal processing is quite infeasible, she locate herself such that the two
channel composition, gAE ∗ gEB, introduces a delay τAE+τEB ' τAB. The last,
but not negligible effect on the signal is the receiver Gaussian noise, respectively
w ∼ N (0, σ2w) for Bob, and η ∼ N (0, σ2η) for Eve, which are independent between
them. And as said above, s is an other Gaussian noise, with its specific statistics,
N (0, σ2s).
These hypothesis result is that Bob will simultaneously receive two sequences, rB
and r′B, of Gaussian symbols:
rB(n) ∼ N (0, σ2s + σ2w)
r
′
B(n) ∼ N (0, σ2s + σ2η + σ2w)
Therefore, via a so-called Hypothesis testing Bob should decide which one among
the two observed symbols is authentic. In other words, with the assumption that
the authentic, and spoofed signals have two different Gaussian distribution, for
each symbol Bob should evaluate the probability that it belongs to the authentic
or fake distribution. However, the hypothesis testing in some cases fails, and more
precisely there are two different errors that can occurs:
• a false alarm, which discard an authentic observation as if it was false;
• a missed detection, which does not detect a false observation, and accepts it
if it was authentic.
Has already done, we are going to accept a maximum error probability, which
upper bounded the hypothesis evaluation failure.
In order to take a choice between the two hypothesis, the Information Theory
give us the Kullback-Leibler divergence, which is a non-symmetric measure of
the difference between two probability distribution P and Q, and thus defined for
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discrete variables:
DKL(P‖Q) =
∑
i
P (i) log P (i)
Q(i) [bits]
However, if Bob should evaluate a divergence only via a priori observation, he would
be in the same poor conditions of Eve. Therefore, here fit the key role, namely
after a while over a noiseless, private and authenticated channel the satellite sends
the key k, which gives Bob the possibility to retrieve perfectly the original sequence
s. Then, since the only channel effect is introducing delay and adding noise, we
have that:
rB − s = w
r′B − s = w + η
thus Bob can discriminate over the measured noise. Obviously, Eve can adopt the
strategy of introducing a very low noise, but on the other hand we can face it with
a more suitable key. First of all, we are going to take into account the following
Kullback-Leibler divergence
DKL(H0‖H1) = DKL
(
p(r˜B,k|gAB)‖p(r˜B,k|gAE ∗ gEB)
)
(5.17)
where H0 and H1 are respectively the authentic and spoofed signal hypothesis,
while r˜B is the generic sequence arrived at Bob receiver. We wish to find how
much are distinguishable two sequences one received from the satellite, and the
other forwarded by a spoofer, jointly with the key knowledge. Applying the
channel condition (i.e. making the hypothesis authentic or spoofed), the divergence
expression is simplified:
DKL(H0‖H1) = DKL
(
p(rB,k)‖p(r′B,k)
)
= DKL
(
p(rB|k)p(k)‖p(r′B|k)p(k)
) (5.18)
Since the knowledge of k should allow Bob to reconstruct s precisely, let assume
k = s. In addition, once the key has been disclosed it is a deterministic term, then
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the formula is even more simplified:
DKL(H0‖H1) = DKL
(
p(rB|s)‖p(r′B|s)
)
(5.19)
Then we have to discriminate between symbols with this two new distributions:
rB(i)|s(i) ∼ N (0, σ2w)
r
′
B(i)|s(i) ∼ N (0, σ2w + σ2η)
Furthermore, given that we have i.i.d. symbols, the divergence over the entire
sequence is expressed as a sum of single symbols divergences. Now, we are going to
exploit the general expression of DKL for zero mean Gaussian variables, p(x) ∼
N (0, σ21) and q(x) ∼ N (0, σ22)
D(P‖Q) =
∫
p(x) ln
(p(x)
q(x)
)
dx
= 12 ln
(
σ22
σ21
)
− 12 +
1
2
(
σ21
σ22
) (5.20)
Going back to our case, we find:
D0 = D
(
p(rB(i)|s(i))‖p(r′B(i)|s(i))
)
= 12 ln
(σ2w + σ2η
σ2w
)
− 12 +
1
2
(
σ2w
σ2w + σ2
)
(5.21)
and
D1 = D
(
p(r′B(i)|s(i))‖p(rB(i)|s(i))
)
= 12 ln
(
σ2w
σ2w + σ2η
)
− 12 +
1
2
(σ2w + σ2η
σ2w
)
(5.22)
To note that via the key knowledge the divergence evaluation must fail with a
probability lower than the two chosen maximal PFA and PMD. For the second
time the key dimension appears as an important issue, and in addition also this
time it helps against the noise. As we have already stated, k has to give Bob fully
information about s, then the desirable property would be k = s. Unfortunately
it is not so practical, in fact keeping the training sequence a Gaussian noise has
been a convenient choice, but it also carries an infinite entropy. As a consequence,
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to guarantee the substitution made in (5.19) and all the previous results, the key
should be made of an infinite number of symbols. This is infeasible, then let us
take the symbol s¯ as a the quantized equivalent of s, k with a discrete alphabet,
and some requirements:
1.
H(s¯) > I(s; rB) + log1/2 F (5.23)
that is, the entropy of the quantized symbol, s¯, should be greater than the
leakage of information that rB (or rE ) gives about the original Gaussian
symbol s. In addition, the second term prevent a potential forging of s which
will imply a complete control over the training phase (e.g. with respect to a
just turned on receiver).
2.
H(k) = nH(s¯) (5.24)
the key is equivalent to a sequence of n symbols with entropy in agreement
with the previous requirement.
A more correct condition for the entropy of s¯ would be H(s¯) > I(s¯, r¯B) + log1/2 F ,
namely the quantized equivalent of 5.23; but once this latter is applied, also the
quantized is true. Indeed, the Gaussian channel maximize the mutual information
between the input, output symbols. Therefore joining together the two conditions,
we obtain H(k) > n
(
I(s, rB) + log1/2 F
)
. The only unknown quantity is n, the
length of s, and it will descend from the minimum required divergence over the
sequence, DKL, to counteract the probability of error. In conclusion we get:
H(k) ≥
(1
2 log2
(
1 + SNR
)
+ log1/2 F
)DKL(σ2η)
DKL(σ2η)
=
(1
2 log2
(
1 + σ
2
s
σ2w
)
+ log1/2 F
)DKL(σ2η)
DKL(σ2η)
(5.25)
Noticed that everything remain true even if Eve τAB 6= τAE + τEB, in fact herein
we have assumed the equality for simplicity, but usually the spoofer aim to mislead
our timing awareness. For instance he can successfully predict the message and
62 CHAPTER 5. DERIVATION OF BOUNDS ON THE KEY SIZE
thus introduce a negative delay - even if it may imply to break the data layer
authentication - or rather he performed a selective replay attack introducing an
additive delay to τAE, but in both cases Bob is faced with only one copy and
should make the correct hypothesis without any other comparison. Therefore, this
skill defend ourselves also against other potential attacks: as a persistent jamming
which prevents us from receiving the authentic signal, or a misalignment during the
tracking that once again makes us lose the correct signal, and finally it solve the
problem of introducing a sequence number to check the presence of any replayed
copy.
A critical aspect is determining the channel coherence time, and consequently
how often Bob should estimate the reference link signature, in fact the satellite
channel realization depends on several aspects, e.g. the instantaneous ionosphere
condition, and any motion attributable to the satellite, the receiver or simply of the
surrounding. However, this channel variation is also a good aspect for us, namely
let suppose that at the preceding step Eve has observed rB, and has evaluated gAB
as soon as k became available, but this knowledge does not guarantee a perfect
channel imitation an instant later.
In conclusion, if the introduction of such a new OS signal component will be
feasible, the idea developed here let us to be confident about the possibility to have
unconditionally secure signal authentication. Obviously, it requires more study
since the real satellite channel is not a single-tap delta.
Chapter 6
Implementations and results
In this chapter we illustrate the bounds computed in Chapter 5 viaMATLABr
numerical evaluations, with certain signals and channels settings. In addition, the
Data layer result will be compared with TESLA performance.
6.1 Navigation data authentication and integrity
protection
We will firstly treat the key entropy theoretical bound required to uncondition-
ally protect the navigation data message, that is:
H(k)
`
≥ log1/2 F + log1/2 M +
[
H(u) + log1/2 F − C0
](
I(x, z)
I(x, y) − 1
)+
(6.1)
Regardless of the specific channel model, the security term F and M can be set.
Herein has been selected a common value for both (e.g. 10−3). Furthermore, for
simplicity we have assumed that C0 is completely filled with the navigation message
u, or its encrypted equivalent s.
6.1.1 A discrete time memoryless AWGN wiretap channel
Recalling the channel setting of Figure 5.2, we are going to simulate the noisy
wiretap channel via the AWGN channel model. As a matter of fact, we need to
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model the channel additive noise, and the AWGN is suitable since it is a simple
model which only impairs the communication means a wideband or white noise
with a constant spectral density and a Gaussian distribution of amplitude. Even if
it does not account for other complex impairments, it produces simple and tractable
mathematical models. The following general assumptions are still valid: Alice and
Bob are connected via a discrete time memoryless (DMC) channel W1 : X → Y ,
and a second DMC is between Alice and the wiretapper, W2 : X → Z. Now, the
channel input symbol, xi, are a continuous variable power constrained, that is
E[x2i ] ≤ P . And the corresponding outputs symbols, yi, are expressed as the sum
of the input xi, and noise wi, which is independent and identically distributed as
N (0, σ2w). In addition, the wi are not correlated with the input xi, and analogously
we have zi = xi + ηi, with ηi ∼ N (0, σ2η). Therefore, based on these assumption
the mutual informations will be properly defined (for simplicity of notation the
sub-scripts will be neglected) as:
I(x, y) ≤ 12 log2
(
1 + P
σ2w
)
(6.2)
I(x, z) ≤ 12 log2
(
1 + P
σ2η
)
(6.3)
The preceding definitions can be considered equalities in the particular case of
Gaussian symbols with xi ∼ N (0, P ), where P is the maximum or constrain power,
which accounts for the transmitting power, and the overall channel effect, e.g.
transmitter and receiver antennas gains, plus the free space path loss. While the
noise power (i.e. variance) may also be indicated as N0B, where B is the receiver
operational bandwidth. Furthermore, we have to remind that the wiretap channel
corresponds to the satellite channel, then the received signal is not xi itself, but
rather xi multiplied via its PRN code. As a consequence P also includes the
additional correlation gain:
I(x, y) = 12 log2
(
1 + Ptx|h|
2gcorr
σ2w
)
(6.4)
I(x, z) = 12 log2
(
1 + Ptx|g|
2gcorr
σ2η
)
(6.5)
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Parameter Notation Value
Satellite transmitting power Ptx 40 W
Satellite antenna gain gtx 14.5 dBi W
Free-space pathloss aPL 180 dB
Antenna efficiency η 0.7
Receiver antenna gain grx 2 dBi
Noise power density (at 300 K) N0 -204 dBW/Hz
Passband filter B 8 MHz
Table 6.1: Satellite and receiver specifications.
where gcorr is expressed as Tsymb/Tchip. In accordance to Galileo parameters we
have:
gcorr =
1/Rsymb
1/Rchip
= Rchip
Rsymb
= 1.023Mchip/s250bit/s = 4.092 · 10
3 ' 36dB
(6.6)
Now, from the point of view of an attacker who wishes to increase his information
on x gained via z, the degrees of freedom in equation (6.5) are his antenna gain, or
his receiver noise power. In the following we are going to consider an even higher
attacker antenna gain, while leaving all the remaining parameters at their nominal
values of Table 6.1. Figure 6.1(a) depicts how the key dimension grows versus an
increasing attacker antenna gain, and a noise power fixed for both parties at the
room temperature nominal value. One can notice that the curve starts increasing
linearly as soon as Eve’s antenna gain exceed the nominal value of 2 dBi, namely
when the attacker becomes more capable than the mass-market receiver. Then, the
first curve portion - almost flat - is defined by the Wegman-Carter scheme bound.
As a consequence of the greater attacker capacity, we must defend ourselves and
close the disadvantage gap with a key of greater length, that can also perform error
correction. In order to show the meaning of the numerical results, we can observe
that a 40 dBi antenna gain corresponds to a radium r ∼ 2.6 m, which is an unusual
dish antenna size if compared with a 2 dBi antenna of 30 cm size. However, the
important outcome is that such an attacker equipment will require about 37 key
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Figure 6.1: The theoretical key entropy needed at each authentication against a
specific attacker antenna gain.
Figure 6.2: The key entropy lower bound for a Gaussian input, against a specific attacker noise
variance, and antenna gain.
bits, that is still viable. While, only for a comparison purpose, Figure 6.1(b) makes
reference to a verification test made before the de-spreading case, in which the
SNR does not contain the correlation gain. In this case a 40 dBi antenna gain
will be defeated with more than 1000 bit key, the reason lies in the great amount
of noise which cover the symbol, therefore the key should perform a strong error
correction. Nevertheless, this curve is given only as an example, because we are
interested in the data message authentication, or rather the bit level.
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Figure 6.3: I(x; z)/I(x; y) behaviour versus Ptx.
Figure (6.2) gives a further and complete proof of how the attacker condition
modifies our data authenticating key size. In this case also the noise power effect
has been taken into account, one can observe that the key entropy grows rather
with an increasing antenna gain for Eve, or for a decreasing noise variance, σ2η, at
her receiver, as reasonably expected. However, as already done above, throughout
the rest of this section we focus on the antenna gain value, since it mainly affects
the corresponding key value.
Therefore, the term
(
I(x, z)
I(x, y) − 1
)+
appears to severely weigh the key size; to
inhibit its undesired effect we could think about increasing the transmitting power,
that is:
lim
Ptx→∞
1
2 log2
(
1 + Ptx|g|
2gcorr
σ2η
)
1
2 log2
(
1 + Ptx|h|
2gcorr
σ2w
) = 1
Therefore, neglecting the predefined Ptx nominal value, we are going to examine
the effect of an increasing satellite transmitting power on the ratio I(x, z)
I(x, y) . From
Figure 6.3a we see that the information gain can be overcome via a small power
increase only up to a 2 dBi stronger attacker, while in the remaining cases the ratio
approaches to 1 for power values around 100-120 dBW. In case (b) the curves are
closer to the asymptote, but they reach it slower, then a small power rise does not
give an interesting beneficial. In conclusion, a transmitting power adjustment is
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quite infeasible, mostly if it is compared to the current used value of 16 dBW, thus
bounded because of consumption reasons.
6.1.2 Binary input and AWGN wiretap channel
Now we are going to analyse the discrete time AWGN channel, in a more realistic
setting where its input symbol xi no longer has a Gaussian distribution, but is
uniformly chosen in the binary alphabet X = {±A}. As regards the channel noise,
all the previous properties still hold, and the same for the power constraint, A2 ≤ P .
The obvious consequence of such a communication, is a lower entropy both for Bob,
and Eve on xi. As a matter of fact, to cope with the term I(x; z)/I(x; y) we can
act in two ways, the former consists on increasing Ptx as already discussed above,
while the second exploits the input alphabet cardinality - in an M-ary scheme the
symbol carries more information if compared to a binary one. Therefore, since a
transmitting power of 100 dBW is not suitable, we are going to analyse the binary
input performance. In this case, the mutual information between input and output
symbols becomes:
I(x; y) = 12f
( A
σw
)
+ 12f
(−A
σw
)
(6.7)
f(a) =
+∞∫
−∞
1√
2pi
e
−(u− a)2
2 log2
( 2
1 + e−2au
)
du (6.8)
(6.9)
and it is analogous for I(x; z). The first important result is depicted in Figure
(6.4(a)), that is the mutual information ratio as a function of the attacker antenna
gain. Also in this case we have supposed that the attacker exploits his antenna
gain, instead of a lower thermal noise. The binary case curve is practically constant
and equal to 1 as desired. As a consequence also the key dimension (Figure 6.4(b))
growth is arrested, and remains constant irrespectively of the attacker antenna. Let
us understand the reason of such a performance: in an AWGN context, any generic
receiver equipped with a mass-market antenna of 2 dBi gain, and at the room
temperature, after having correlated the received signal by his own replica, reaches
6.1. NAVIGATION DATAAUTHENTICATION AND INTEGRITY PROTECTION69
−10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Eve’s antenna gain [dB]
I x,
z/I
x,
y
 
 
X continuous, AWGN ch
X binary, AWGN ch
(a) I(x, z)/I(x, y) behaviour versus the
attacker antenna gain.
−10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Eve’s antenna gain [dB]
Ke
y 
en
tro
py
 p
er
 ro
un
d 
[bi
t/ro
un
d]
 
 
X continuous, AWGN ch.
X binary, AWGN ch.
(b) The theoretical key entropy needed
at each authentication against a specific
attacker antenna gain
Figure 6.4: A comparison between Binary and Gaussian input.
a perfect knowledge of xi, or rather I(x; y) = 1 bit. By this observation follows
that for an attacker, that reasonably and by assumption is at least equally capable,
I(x; z) = 1. This result may seem contradictory with the requirement of making it
hard, to any wiretapper to decode the message, since it can carries key-leakage.
However, the initially established F and M guarantee us that any attempt to
guess the correct tag by a forging or modification attack will have the corresponding
pre-defined low success probability, namely it is offering unconditionally secure
authentication and integrity protection. Any perfect knowledge of x, does not bring
any additional information on the key used, thus from the point of view of Eve each
tag is equally likely. This applies with the assumption that the key is changed each
time, otherwise its length will be extended to ` times the single authentication key
size, in agreement with (6.1). The latter option would be not be costless in term
of bandwidth, if the key needs to be broadcast (delayed) via the satellite channel.
In conclusion, if security parameters are already sufficiently robust, the infinite
entropy Gaussian symbol brings an unnecessary key expenditure.
The last thing that it is worth observing about the data authentication, is a
comparison between the theory and the protocol that currently seems to be the
most promising, namely TESLA. The version presented in [20] at the Institute of
Navigation (ION) proposes to adopt a single key-chain, in which each ki 82 bits
long, and authenticates the navigation message via a MAC of 10 bits. Therefore,
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Figure 6.5: Diffrents F curves compared to TESLA of [20].
in accordance to our idea we set F = 1/(210) = 9.7656 · 10−4, and equivalently
for M . Figure (6.5) shows the theoretical key entropy bound (both for Gaussian
and Binary input) for several F values, and the TESLA ki size. It appears that
the TESLA key is visibly higher than its corresponding  curve, whose binary case
states that 20 bit are sufficient to guarantee unconditionally secure authentication.
Then, the protocol seems not efficient as it uses four times the bits strictly necessary,
thus wasting some bit rate to share the key. However, in accordance to this work
we can only state that TESLA with the single ki, and the corresponding MAC, is
providing its users unconditionally secure authentication and integrity protection
of the navigation message bits against forging or modification attacks. It does
not mean that TESLA key-chain is unbreakable, but our bound is considering the
single key, thus we cannot say more.
In conclusion, as regards the practical application, the noisy wiretap channel
setting is easily viable. Indeed, if the connection is available the user has the
possibility to download the navigation message from the network, while the tag
comes over the noisy satellite (i.e. wiretap) channel. Otherwise, everything will
be received from the satellite, as occurs usually, resulting only in an higher key
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minimal entropy. And also the key bound performance, observed for the Binary
input AWGN channel, is expected to be similar to the real one. In fact, the AWGN
model simplifies the mutual information computation, but a multipath channel will
not increase it.
6.2 Signal authentication and integrity protec-
tion
After having analysed the key entropy bound required at Data layer, we are
going on with the second, but not less important, result at the Signal layer:
H(k) ≥
(1
2 log2
(
1 + SNRBob
)
+ log1/2 F
)DKL(σ2η)
DKL(σ2η)
=
(1
2 log2
(
1 + σ
2
s
σ2w
)
+ log1/2 F
)
nmin
(6.10)
6.2.1 The single-tap AWGN channel
Remind that in this case, in order to provide a first idea implementation, we are
adopting an ideal single-tap AWGN channel, and no correlation gain are considered,
since now our focus is the signal how it is get. Let us define the three Gaussian
symbols:
1. the transmitted signal, s ∼ N (0, σ2s). Whose noise variance has been set
equal to -157 dBW, that is, the Gaussian sequence carries the minimum
guaranteed power for Galileo E1 signal in space (before the correlation
process);
2. the legitimate receiver thermal noise, w ∼ N (0, σ2w). Whose power spectral
density, N0, has been assumed equal to -204dBW/Hz - the typical expected
value at the room temperature on earth. The receiver filtering process
will keep the signal and noise power only over a 8 MHz bandwidth, then
σ2w = −134dBW ;
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Figure 6.6: The Kullback-Leibler divergence as function of σ2η.
3. the attacker receiver thermal noise, η. Also this latter is expected to be
Gaussian, but we let its power to be lower than the typical value of −134dBW
- precisely, σ2η will drop until the value of −200dBW , which corresponds to
T ∼ 0K◦.
Recalling our idea exposed along 5.2.2, the receiver with the key knowledge should
be able to discriminate an authentic symbol rB from the spoofed one, r
′
B, observing
the corresponding noise power. Therefore, the attacker strategy becomes: being
able to low down his receiver thermal noise, σ2η Figure (6.6) depicts the two Kullback-
Leibler divergences within the attacker noise power range of values. As we have
mentioned, KL divergence is a not-symmetric measure, but the behaviour of curves
(a) and (b) against the increasing σ2η is almost the same. Basically, it appears that
we are not able to discriminate two symbols (i.e. authentic and false) with more
than 15 dBW of power difference.
Unfortunately, an hypothesis test outcome may not be always correct (even under
the 15 dBW of difference), namely a false allarm or a missed detection may occur.
Therefore, we are going to set a maximum allowed error probability value for PFA
and PMD on the entire sequence, which has to be respected regardless the attacker
noise specific value. To clarify, we should make reference to Figure (6.7): the area
on bottom left corner defines our desired detection region, within which we are
almost confident about our hypothesis. On the other hand, the green line identify
the attacker aim, indeed on the diagonal the detection error is sure. The missed
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Figure 6.8: The required key entropy versus an increasing C/N0 for the attacker, and fixed at
47 dBW-Hz for Bob.
detection probability can be defined as 12D0 , and analogously PFA =
1
2D1 . For
this simulation PFA and PMD have been upper bounded by 10−3. Now, the KL
divergence per symbol is not so high to respect the constraint, but obviously the
training sequence s is made of several symbols, the problem is how long should it
be? The minimum sequence length nmin has been computed as that number that
multiplied by the KL divergence of Figure (6.6) let us to reach the good detection
region. Obviously, in correspondence of lower σ2η values, we have a lower divergence
as well, therefore the suitable nmin will higher. Once the sequence length has been
defined, we are left with the last key requirement, in fact k should also defeat any
forging attack on s symbols. Then, as already done, we are going to upper bound
the successful attack by F , which we have set equal to 10−3 as well. Finally, Figure
(6.8) depicts the key entropy lower bound based on our idea of signal authentication
made via a channel estimation.
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For a more practical purpose the curve has been expressed as a function of
the attacker C
N0
value, instead of on his noise variance, σ2η. One can observe that
for C/N0 = 46dBW , practically the attacker is in a poor condition, and as a
consequence k = 500bit is enough to prevent a forging attack, and to give Bob
the possibility of correctly retrieve s in order to, secondly, distinguish the received
symbol as authentic or fake. As the attacker C/N0 starts increasing - as an effect of
a reduced noise variance (as we simulated) or equivalently of an high gain antenna
- the required key entropy grows as well. We can state that up to 55 dBW of C/N0
for the attacker, the signal authentication is viable with about 10 Kb key entropy,
but an even more powerful attack becomes hardly defeated. However, we can think
that 55 dBW corresponds to ∼ 45K◦, that is completely different from a common
mass-market receiver equivalent temperature. Then, even if the single-tap AWGN
channel is not the usual real scenario, it has been useful in order to simulate the
attacker potential attack - a replay attack over an approximate authentic channel.
And we have been able to find a solution, and the corresponding key to defeat a
not-common attacker equipment.
A comparison between the existing signal-layer mechanisms and our bound has
not been possible, since these are concentrated on authenticating the signal, while
we have though about a channel estimation and authentication. However, 3.2.2 has
outlined how these mechanism are not unconditionally secure, for sure. In addition,
our idea about distinguishing whether the received signal is authentic or not, seems
to be robust also against a Relay attack, that was left un-defeated. In fact, the
attacker connecting his antenna to the victim receiver via e.g. a line, or cable, will
inevitably add further noise.
While, as regards the E1 new component practical definition, we can only
require the symbol Gaussian distribution, and possibly a typical noise power level.
The multiplex of it, with the rest has to be well-studied. The satellite PRN code
exploitation is not so suitable, since here we are not ranging the training sequence.
Then, one can think about assigning a distinct frequency to each SV, namely to
employ a FDMA medium access. In this manner the single satellite is allowed
to send the same s, by modulating its unique carrier, and multiplexing it with
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the remaining E1 channels, i.e. A,B, and C. Unfortunately, this option may be
vulnerable versus narrow band jamming attacks. Therefore, a second option may
be to simply add s the other three channels, already spread via the PRN code. And
finally, to multiply the whole E1 signal by a second spreading code. In this manner,
the data detection and authentication has to wait a previous signal de-spreading
and verification. Which makes sense, in fact if the signal present any anomaly we
will not waste time in data verification. A such defined multiplexed signal, jointly
with a time synchronization between s and the PRN code, is going to prevent also
an Early Bit Detection attack. Basically, the attacker may be able to detect the
authenticator bits, and replay the entire signal with a negative delay. But since it
is hard to retrieve s, it will be even more infeasible to detect its beginning point,
and to successively reconstruct a synchronized signal.
6.2.2 The DLR channel model
As highlighted, the radio navigation signal which reaches our antennas, is
what we observe after many propagation and channel effects e.g. ionosphere and
troposphere attenuation, scattering, diffraction and reflection. All these phenomena
jointly give us a multipath propagation, which will be more or less significant
depending on the receiver environment (e.g. rural, sub-urban, urban). But, for
sure, a delta channel is almost impossible to be met. Furthermore, we need to
estimate the channel impulse response at the beginning of a coherence time interval.
However with an orbiting satellite, the channel keeps changing, even if there is
only a propagation delay effect. Therefore, one can expects how this issue severely
increases within a moving scenario, and a time varying multipath channel.
In order to study the channel estimation reliability from the point of view of a
legitimate receiver, and of an attacker that wishes to imitate it, we have though to
employ an existing satellite channel model. That is, the Channel Model for Land
Mobile Satellite Navigation of [17], developed at the German Aerospace Center
(DLR). In 2002 they have performed a campaign of measures employing a Zeppelin
working nearby the L1 carrier, in order to simulate a GNSS satellite. The signal was
received by a moving van, and upon the recorded data a channel model has been
derived. The model is based on both deterministic and stochastic processes within
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an artificial scenery, that has to be parametrised depending on the user necessaries.
Basically, the direct path, or Line-Of-Sight (LOS) is influenced by three types of
obstacles: house fronts, trees and lampposts of a specific scenery. While as regards
the reflected signals, or echoes, they are assumed to be statistically distributed in
the x, y, z space. The DLR MATLAB script generates the scenery in accordance to
two different surrounding options - Urban and Suburban, and user-type, Pedestrian
or Car. Because of our purposes, herein we have exploited the
LandMobileMultipathChannel_Demo_UrbanPedestrian.m from DLR. Furthermore,
as initial step, we have maintained the receiver antenna fixed. In other words, we
have set v = 0, and the heading was kept constant as well, e.g. 0◦ (in this way
there were nor any turning around itself). In order to have outcomes as realistic as
possible, we have used satellites real positions (i.e. Elevation and Azimuth angles)
observed in Padua during the day. This data have been sampled with Tsamp = 52 s,
since in this time interval the angle changes are negligible.
Therefore, via this model we have generated an artificial urban scenery (with
random obstacles positions and dimensions), and recorded the corresponding
channel impulse response gAB. This latter, is no more a delta function, but rather
has one or more LOS rays, and several multipath echoes. Practically, once the
artificial scenery is created, each method generate invocation outputs a complex
time-variant channel impulse:
gA,B(t, τ) =
N(t)∑
k=1
ak(t)δ(τ − τk(t))
The observed number, amplitudes, and delay of channel coefficient depends statisti-
cally or deterministically on the current scenery. The LOS ray may be unique, high
and with delay zero if the line of sight is free of obstacles. Or it will have up to three,
small components with different amplitudes and delays, if a build is diffracting
it. And finally the LOS can be completely blocked if, for instance, receiver and
satellite are not aligned and not negligible obstacles are in the middle. But during
the 52 s (and up to a considerable satellite movement) the LOS is constant, or
rather deterministic. On the other hand, the number of multipath rays, their delays
and amplitudes depend on the current obstacles, and satellite positions, but also
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on the reflectors distance to the receiver. However, as a consequence of our setting
(i.e. a fixed receiver), the delays are constant as long as the satellite view does not
change considerably. In fact, the DLR has assumed that once shaped and placed,
all obstacles have a deterministic behaviour, except for treetops whose behaviour
is modelled by a statistical process. Namely, the reflection points (e.g. a house
wall) move according to the movement of the receiver, while others remain at fixed
positions. Therefore, between consecutive time instants, the multipath echoes are
changing only in amplitude and phase because of the stochastic motion of tree leaves.
We are interested in investigating the statistical behaviour of channel coefficients
with respect to time. In order to derive significant statistics we have simulated
100 distinct scenarios (ωi), always keeping the receiver antenna position fixed.
Furthermore, 600 different satellite positions (i.e. Elevation and Azimuth angles)
have been considered, which corresponds to about a 7 hours observation window.
A sampling frequency of 1 Hz has been adopted to estimate the channel. That is,
we have one channel impulse response per second.
One might expect that, the channel impulse response observed seven hours
later will be completely un-correlated with the corresponding channel realization
observed at t = 0.
The precise outcomes of the channel behaviour should help us in deciding how
often we need to estimate the channel impulse response, and consequently, to
defend ourselves against a channel imitation. Then, we have decided to evaluate
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two different distributions:
1. the authentic joint distribution: p(h(t0), h(t)). That is what exactly the user
observes, from his position, at the two distinct time instants, t0 and t.
2. the false distribution: p(h(t0)p(h(t). Obtained as if h(t0) and h(t) were in-
dependent, that is if h(t) were simulated by the attacker without prior
observation of h(t0). In fact, for the attacker it is hard to know what is the
channel impulse response realization at time t, since a physical access to the
antenna is excluded.
Then, we can expect an high divergence if the two estimates of the authentic
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channel are temporally highly correlated, while between the authentic and forged
impulse response there is a low spatial correlation. That is, the attacker is not close
to the receiver antenna (e.g. some kilometres apart), thus he can only compute an
average estimate of the receiver actual scenario.
Basically, we are going to deal with complex Gaussian vectors. The corresponding
a posteriori KL divergence (i.e. it is computed only once the key has been delivered,
and consequently the channel estimation has become possible) is expressed as
follows:
DKL(H0‖H1) =
tr(Σ−11 Σ0) + (m1 −m0)TΣ−11 (m1 −m0)−K + ln
(det(Σ1)
det(Σ0)
)
ln(2) [bits]
DKL(H1‖H0) =
tr(Σ−10 Σ1) + (m1 −m0)TΣ−10 (m1 −m0)−K + ln
(det Σ0
det Σ1
)
ln(2) [bits]
Where m0 and m1 are the corresponding mean vectors, which are identical, K is
the vector space size, and Σ0, Σ1 are the covariance matrices. Which are distinct,
and on them is based the divergence. The legitimate receiver, who perfectly knows
its actual scenario, computes the covariance matrix Σ0 on the such defined matrix:
h1(ω1, t0) . . . hN(ω1, t0) h1(ω1, t) . . . hN(ω1, t)
h1(ω2, t0) . . . . . . . . . . . . hN(ω2, t)
... ... ... ... ... ...
h1(ω100, t0) . . . . . . . . . . . . hN(ω100, t)

The corresponding Σ0 is 2N × 2N matrix partitioned in block as:
Σ0 =
[
A B
BT D
]
, B =

k1,1 k1,2 . . . k1,N
k2,1 k2,2 . . . k2,N
... . . . ... ...
kN,1 kN,2 . . . kN,N
 (6.11)
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Figure 6.9: The correlation between the first three channel coefficients amplitudes, versus time.
while
Σ1 =
[
A 0
0 D
]
The diagonal elements in block B, of matrix Σ0, are particularly significant for us.
These are the covariances between corresponding channel coefficients, at different
time instants. It is reasonable to have high covariances for the earlier time instant,
but as t increases, the generic ki,i should approach zero. Namely, the two channels
become less correlated, and approach independence since the vectors are Gaussian.
When they are approximately independent, we have Σ0 ' Σ1. That is, the receiver
is no longer able to discriminate the estimated channel as authentic or forged,
because there is no correlation with the reference one. This analysis applied to the
DLR model output, gives the correlation and divergence respectively reported in
Figure 6.9 and 6.10. Descends that the coefficients are highly correlated over the
entire seven hours period, or in other words Σ0 never approaches Σ1. Consequently,
the KL divergence does not vanish as expected, even after a long time.
The realism of these outcomes, with v = 0 is questionable correct, even if the DLR
model is universally recognized as trusted. Hence, by the model outcomes, appears
that distinguishing between authentic and forged channels would always be possible
even many hours after the initial secure estimate.
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Figure 6.10: The KL divergence between the two distributions as a function of
time.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
For sure, the GNSS signal Authentication and Integrity Protection is a critical
issue. Its particular requirements demand for a reassessment of authentication
schemes in use for other wireless communication systems. In addition, we should
work at both Data and Signal layers. Some proposals already exist, but these are
only computationally secure, or not efficiently designed. Or even, they are focused
on a precise form of attack, and are neglecting different attacker strategies, or
equipment.
This thesis has fitted into this complex scenario, and has attempted to offer a useful
contribution without presuming to identify the better authentication scheme. It
has searched for two universal lower-bound of the key length. The problem has
been analysed from a Physical-Layer point of view. Namely, the channel features
like its capacity or the additive noise have been largely employed. Further, the
attacker capabilities have not been limited, both in computational, and channel
terms.
Therefore, in agreement with the unconditional security definition, the allowed
attacker success probability has been  upper-bounded, e.g. forging, modification,
false alarm and missed detection. In addition, we have defined the key size as a
function of the attacker action. For instance, the key increases with an eventually
higher antenna gain for the Data case, or according to a decreasing noise power for
the Signal-layer one. In other words, we are offering a key bound, which everyone
can adapt to his own channel parameters, and regardless how cunning the attacker
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is, the key will guarantee the desired -unconditionally secure authentication and
integrity protection.
As regards the practical feasibility, the only thing to be proved is the introduction
of the E1 signal new component. If possible, it will give us an additional degree of
freedom in authentication design. However, it will require a deeper study about
how to combine signal-authentication requirements with Galileo technical specifics.
An other future work, will be to analyse the two bounds behaviours versus a more
complex channel (i.e. with motion and multipath effects). The only expected
problem regards the channel estimation, or rather its coherence time interval.
A last aspect that we have not treated, is the key management. In both cases,
respectively Data and Signal authentication, we have supposed to adopt a TESLA
approach. Namely, at the authentication time instant k is private. And it becomes
public as soon as every one has received the signal. The important aspect is that k
will never be available in time for a potential attack. We have mentioned about a
private, authenticated, noiseless channel. This may be either the satellite channel
with error correction, either a network link. In both cases this channel will require
an additional authenticating key, and a renewal process of it. Notice that this is
not a secondary issue, indeed if an attacker will be able to break this key, he will
acquire complete control of the authentication mechanism. And also in this case
we should employ the Information Theory aid, and to look for an unconditionally
secure key management.
In conclusion, although the attacker has a wide set of possibility to attack the
GNSS signal, the achievement of this thesis highlight that there is the possibility for
message and signal unconditionally secure authentication and integrity protection.
For sure, in some cases the channel properties, or the particularly strong attacker,
will require a corresponding non-practical key size. And we should admit that
in some circumstances the GNSS signal authentication and integrity protection
become hard, or even impossible. However, we must ensure signal authentication
first to higher priority situations, such as to an aircraft/ship route monitoring, or
to financial trades. This kind of scenarios are expected to be easier, because of a
quasi line-of-sight propagation, or due to the receiver antenna staticity.
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